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Power and Preferences: Developing Countries and
the Role of the WTO Appellate Body
Peter M. Gerhartt& Archana Seema Kellatt
ABSTRACT

Although it is conventional to view the World Trade
Organization (WTO) as a law-based regime, we should not
underestimate the ways in which state power has molded, and
continues to mold, the regime. Understanding the role of power is
especially important for our understanding of the relationship
between developed and developing countries, the disparity of
power between the two has provided the GATT/WTO regime with
the challenge of trying to incorporate the powerless developing
states into a system that is built on power. We review that
challenge in the context of the dispute over the conditions that
developed countries impose when they give developing countries
preferential trade agreements. Because such preferences are, in
theory, gifts, not exchanges, they should be understood as methods
by which powerful countries recognize and respond to the
powerlessness of the developing countries. Yet as developed
countries put more and more conditions on the preferences, they
diminish the redistributive character of the preferences, and the
preferences begin to look like additional sources of power rather
than unilateral gifts to powerless states.
We examine the role of the WTO's Appellate Body in
monitoring this dynamic between the powerful and powerless
states.
Although the Appellate Body performs a judicial,
interpretive function, its role in the WTO calls for a far more
politically sensitive posture. Without abandoning its interpretive
function, the Appellate Body must be attentive to the systemic
values that drive the WTO regime. We believe that within the
interpretive discretion that it has, the Appellate Body has
t Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve School of Law. The author expresses his
appreciation to Ruth Kruezer.
tt J.D. Case Western Reserve University, 2004
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recognized, and should exercise, the role of monitoring the power
relationships between developed and developing countries.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

5 16
Introduction ..........................................................................
522
Power in the WTO ...............................................................
A. The Role of Economic Power ........................................ 523
B. Power and the GSP System ............................................ 531
III. The Problem of Conditional Preferences ............................. 537
IV. The Decision in European Communities - Conditional
542
Preferences ...........................................................................
A. The European Community's GSP Program ................... 542
546
B . The D ecision ...................................................................
V. Legal Implications for Other Conditional GSP Programs ...552
A. Interpretation of the Term "General" ............................ 553
B. Interpretation of the Term "Non-Discriminatory". ........ 554
C. Requirement of "Non-reciprocal" ................................. 558
VI. The Role of the WTO Appellate Body ................................ 562
568
A . Jurisprudence of Power ..................................................
B. Jurisprudence of Participation ........................................ 570
572
VII. C onclusion ............................................................................
I.
II.

I. Introduction
Our tendency, when confronted with a new institution, is to try
to understand and appraise it by drawing analogies to institutions
that are familiar to us. Therefore, when the World Trade
Organization (WTO) was founded a decade ago, its dispute
settlement system was thought to be similar to the judicial branch
of any governing organization - independent from the
"lawmaking" branch by serving only an adjunct, interpretive
function.' As apt as the analogy is, even judicial bodies take their
character from their surroundings, and this has proven to be true of
the "judicial branch" of the WTO - the Panels and, especially, the
Appellate Body that oversee the dispute settlement system.2 Over
I See generally Peter M. Gerhart, The Two Constitutional Visions of the World
Trade Organization, 24 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 1 (2003) (showing that the WTO can
best be understood as an institution of international participatory lawmaking, giving each
member an opportunity to participate in the lawmaking of other members).
2 The "judicial" branch of the WTO was created under the Understanding on
Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, commonly referred to as
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the past ten years, it has become apparent that the Appellate Body
plays a unique judicial role in the WTO multilateral trade regime.3
This article argues that the Appellate Body must, in the context of
its interpretive function, modulate the power relationships between
developed and developing countries in order to uphold the
systemic values underlying the WTO regime.
The Appellate Body's 2004 decision in European
Communities-Conditionsfor the Granting of Tariff Preferences
to
Developing
Countries (hereinafter
EC-Conditional
Preferences)4 provides a lens to assess the role of the Appellate
Body with respect to the power relationships among WTO
members. Although the decision, on its face, appears to be quite
narrow, its implications for understanding the WTO are quite
broad. In particular, the decision allows us to examine anew both
the role of developing countries in the WTO system and the
judicial role of the Appellate Body in interpreting the treaty
obligations of WTO members.
The EC- ConditionalPreferences case was brought by India to
challenge preferences in the form of lower tariffs that the
European Communities (EC) made available to Pakistan but not to
India.5 The EC's preference program designated Pakistan as an
eligible beneficiary country because of its drug trafficking and
the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), which authorizes the Dispute Settlement
Body (DSB) to establish panels, adopt Panel and Appellate Body reports, maintain
surveillance of how countries implement rulings and recommendations, and authorize
suspension of concessions and other obligations under the covered agreements. WTO,
Understandingon Rules and ProceduresGoverning the Settlement of Disputes,available
at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu-e/dsu-e.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2005)
[hereinafter WTO, Understanding on Rules and Procedures]. Unlike the dispute system
under GATT, the DSU provides strict timelines on proceedings, the right to a Panel,
review by the Appellate Body, and automatic adoption of reports. Marc L. Busch & Eric
Reinhardt, Developing Countries and General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World
Trade OrganizationDispute Settlement, 37 J. WORLD TRADE 719, 721 (2003).
3 For a comprehensive review of the similarities and dissimilarities between
dispute settlement at the WTO and domestic dispute resolution, as well as an appraisal of
dispute settlement in the context of the evolving international trade regime, see Donald
McRae, What is the Future of WTO Dispute Settlement?, 7 J. INT.'L ECON. L. 3 (2004).
4 European Communities - Conditionsfor the Granting of Tariff Preferences to
Developing Countries, REPORT OF THE APPELLATE BODY, WT/DS246/AB/ R (Apr. 7,

2004), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispue/246abre.doc
visited Feb. 21, 2005) [hereinafter AB REPORT].
5 See Id.

(last
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production reduction programs. 6
India, however, was not
designated as an eligible beneficiary country. Because Pakistan's
producers faced lower European tariffs than Indian producers,
some Pakistani producers had more favorable access to European
markets than producers from India.7
The narrow issue in the case, therefore, was whether, and to
what extent, a developed country may discriminate between
similarly situated developing countries when designing a program
under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) system. 8 As
is described in greater detail later, 9 the Appellate Body ruled that a
developed country granting lower tariffs under the GSP Program
need not treat all recipient countries alike, but that any differential
treatment of developing countries must be based on positive,
objective criteria that, when fairly applied, distinguish between
developing countries on a basis that reflects their different
developmental needs.1l Based on these positive and objective
development criteria, all similarly situated countries must be
treated alike. 1 In so ruling, the Appellate Body not only clarified
the legal framework for assessing conditional and differential
treatment, but also provided a picture of the logic underlying the
GSP program and the role of developing countries in the WTO
system.
The scholarly commentary on the issues raised in ECConditional Preferences has been mixed, reflecting preexisting
views about the relationship between developed and developing
countries. Some scholars contend that GSP programs should not
be subject to "hard law" constraints that unduly bind the freedom
of developed countries to determine the basis on which they will
6 See infra notes 145-72 and accompanying text.
7 Because the preferences were discriminatory, they created artificial advantages
for Pakistani producers, and it is possible that Pakistani producers made sales in Europe
that could have been made more efficiently by producers in India; thus, the
discrimination had the political and economic impacts of any preferential trading
agreement. See BELA BALASSA, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION (1961); THE
ECONOMICS OF INTEGRATION, M. KRAUSS (ed.) (1973); A. EL-ALGRAA & A. JONES,
THEORY OF CUSTOMS UNIONS (1981).

8 See AB REPORT, supra note 4.

9 See infra notes 143-72 and accompanying text.
10 Id.
II See AB REPORT, supra note 4.
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provide preferences..12 Under this view, the Appellate Body has
only a narrow role in reviewing the conditions that donor countries
place on their preferences, and controversies surrounding these
conditions must instead be addressed in political negotiations.' 3
This view emphasizes the importance of maintaining the ability of
a donor country, such as the United States, to grant or withdraw
GSP treatment based on its own policy objectives and political
values.14 Other commentators, however, are not particularly
troubled by the notion that the Appellate Body could have a role in
reviewing the terms under which preferences are granted. 5 Still
other scholars are sympathetic to the plight of developing
countries, and have been highly critical of the conditions that6
donor countries have attached to the preferences they give.'
Commentary appearing since the Appellate Body opinion issued
the EC ConditionalPreferences decision has questioned aspects of
the Appellate Body's opinion without trying to evaluate its impact
on the multilateral trading system. 7
12 See generally Robert Howse, India's WTO Challenge to Drug Enforcement
Conditions in the European Community Generalized System of Preferences: A Little
Known Case with Major Repercussions for "Political" Conditionality in US Trade

Policy, 4 CI. J. INT'L L. 385 (2003) (arguing that GSP is aspirational only and therefore
not subject to judicial control) [hereinafter Howse, India's WTO Challenge]; Robert
Howse et al., in Internet Roundtable, The Appellate Body's GSP Decision, 3 WORLD
TRADE REVIEW 239, 246 (2004) [hereinafter Internet Roundtable]; Robert Howse, Back
to Court After Shrimp/Turtle? Almost But Not Quite Yet: India's Short Lived Challenge
to Labor and EnvironmentalExceptions in the European Union's Generalized System of

Preference, 18 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 1333 (2003) (analyzing India's additional
preferences for countries that meet labor and environmental standards) [hereinafter Back
to Court After Shrimp/Turtle].
13 See Howse, India's WTO Challenge, supra note 12.
14 See id. at 386.
15 See generally Lorand Bartels,

The WTO

Enabling Clause and Positive

Conditionality in the European GSP Program, 6 J. OF INT.'L ECON. L. 507 (2003)
(assessing the system of positive conditionality in light of WTO rules); Gregory
Shaffer & Yvonne Apea, Putting the GSP Case in Context: Who Decides the Conditions
for Trade Preferences, in TRADE AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Thomas Cottier & Joost

Pauwelyn, eds., 2005) (publication forthcoming) (outlining the institutional choices that
the Appellate Body faced when deciding the case).
16 See generally Abdulqawi

A. Yusuf, "Differential and More Favorable

Treatment:" The GATT Enabling Clause, 14 J. WORLD TRADE L. 488 (1980) (reviewing

development of the GSP as a benefit to developing countries).
17 See generally Howse et al., Internet Roundtable, supra note 12, at 239 (finding
benefit in Appellate Body reversal and seemingly supporting Appellate Body
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Our view of the opinion draws on many of these ideas, but
because we see the Appellate Body's opinion 8 as more farreaching than the narrow holding would suggest, we evaluate the
opinion in a wider context. Because the decision focused on the
purpose of the GSP program in the context of the relationship
between developed and developing countries,' 9 the Appellate
Body's holding necessarily implicates questions about the role of
power in the WTO regime. Not only does the Appellate Body's
opinion suggest how we may understand conditions that granting
countries place on their GSP programs - a matter of great
contention between developed and developing countries - but it
also forces us to examine the role that power plays in the WTO
system, and the role that the Appellate Body plays with respect to
the power relationships. In particular, the Appellate Body's
opinion gives us occasion to think about the GSP program in
political, rather than legal, terms and to understand in new ways
the role of the Appellate Body as an intermediary power broker
between strong and weak WTO member notions.
Because our interpretation of the Appellate Body's role hinges
on the nature of power within the WTO system, we direct our
attention to that issue first. Part II of this article discusses the role
and nature of power within the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) and WTO system, and the role that the GSP
program has played to integrate countries with little economic
power into this system. Our portrayal of the role of developing
countries differs from traditional accounts because we emphasize
the political, rather than economic, factors that influence the
position of developing countries. By viewing the GSP programs
as antidotes to the relative powerlessness of developing countries,
we situate the legal issue before the Appellate Body in political,
rather than legal, terms. To be sure, a legal standard governs the
conditions that a donor country may impose, but the political
reality shows that the underlying problem addressed by the GSP
system is one of power. This political orientation exposes the

endorsement of multilateral agreements as creating WTO-relevant norms), and Howse et
al., Internet Roundtable, supra note 12, at 241 & 245 (noting the "important practical
implications for conditionality on the EC and US GSP programs").
18 AB REPORT, supra note 4.
19 Id.
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underlying dilemma in the legal oversight of GSP programs:
preferences are given at the discretion of developed countries, not
pursuant to obligations required by the treaties or the WTO. The
voluntary nature of preferences has induced developed countries to
grant preferences conditionally. It is the nature of those conditions
that is at the heart of legal and political disputes about the
administration of GSP programs.
To explore conditional preferences under the GSP system in a
larger context, however, we note that conditional GSP preferences
are not an isolated phenomenon. They are similar in nature to any
gift that carries with it conditions. Part III of this Article therefore
provides an analytical framework for understanding the general
legal attitude toward conditional gifts -and the circumstances
under which conditional gifts can become tools of impermissible
power. This Part addresses the general claim that because gifts do
not have to be given, adding conditions to the gifts cannot be
Here, we rely on theories of unconstitutional
objectionable.
conditions and gifts against public policy to show the
circumstances under which gifts or privileges may not be
conditioned on the recipient surrendering certain rights or
freedoms.
Part IV then summarizes the decision of the Appellate Body in
the EC-ConditionalPreferences case, showing how the Appellate
Body interpreted the relevant law to reflect conditionality limits
that are inherent in the WTO scheme for preferences.2 Here, we
emphasize the Appellate Body's understanding that GSP
privileges must be administered with an awareness of the recipient
country's powerlessness.
Next, in Part V of the article, we extrapolate from the
Appellate Body's holding to articulate a general framework for
analyzing the conditions that granting countries place on GSP
programs. This provides the reader with a set of general principles
that are likely to determine the outcome of future challenges to
conditional GSP programs.
Our concern, however, is not just the legal, but also the
political, ramifications of the decision in EC-Conditional
Preferences. We discuss those political ramifications in Section
VI, explaining how the Appellate Body, through this ruling, has
20 AB REPORT, supra note 4.
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placed itself in a position to oversee the power relationships
among members in the WTO system. This position enables the
Appellate Body to place meaningful limits on the exercise of
power by the developed countries, while also recognizing that
power cannot be avoided in a system of law that is based on
bargaining power. Thus, we identify a role for the Appellate Body
that has heretofore gone unnoticed; a role in which the Appellate
Body's interpretive function must be undertaken with a view
toward the systemic interests that lie at the heart of the WTO
system. We recognize the Appellate Body as a systemic stabilizer
that is able to tilt its interpretations in a way that provides all the
disparate members of the WTO with good reasons to continue
their support of the GATT/WTO system.
Part VII concludes with a summary of our analysis and
explains why the political, systemic function that we identify for
the Appellate Body is an appropriate basis for its exercise of
judicial power.
II. Power in the WTO
Integrating developing countries into the GATT/ WTO regime
has been a complicated process. 21 Although most scholars contend
that the reason for the uneasy integration is that the developing
countries have a different relationship to free trade than developed
countries, as we explain in this section, that rationale is an
The position of
incomplete understanding of the issue.22
developing countries in the WTO is as much a reflection of their
lack of power as it is a reflection of their economic interests or
integrating capacities. 23 Relative power remains an integral
feature of the WTO regime.24 Even though the WTO now
oversees as rule-based system, and even though the legal
obligations of such a law-based, rule-oriented system can be costly
to ignore, it must be understood that the basis on25which that law is
made is power, not democratic decision making.
21 Richard H. Steinberg, In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based
Bargainingand Outcomes in the GATT/WTO, 56 INT'L. ORG. 339, 341-47 (2002).
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id.

25 Id.
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A. The Role of Economic Power
The WTO's primary purpose is to allow members to bargain
with each other in order to obtain binding commitments to change
policies that adversely affect the welfare of other member
countries.2 6 This bargaining is inherently power-based.27 WTO
members negotiate market access commitments, for example,
based on the size and diversity of their economies.28 Members
with the greatest economic wealth and most diversified
economies, such as the United States and the EC, have more to
offer in negotiations and less to lose in the event that negotiations
break down. 29 Thus, they have more bargaining power than other
members. At the other end of the spectrum, members with little
wealth and diversity in their economies have the least to offer in
any given negotiation and the most to lose if the negotiations are
unsuccessful.3" Consequently, in the absence of effective coalition
building or other strategic considerations, these countries have the
least bargaining power in the system and wealthy countries are
significantly more likely to secure their desired outcomes under
the WTO.
Over the years the GATT/WTO system has become
increasingly subject to legal, rather than political, control.3 As
members have taken on new commitments, the power of the
wealthy countries has been decreased, and some commitments
26 Gerhart, supra note 1.
27 Steinberg, supra note 21 (conceptualizing the two modalities of bargaining
power as law-based and power-based and finding that when trade rounds are law-based,
more equitable results have been achieved but when trade rounds are power-based,
asymmetrical contracts favoring the interests of powerful states are more likely). See
also Gregory Shaffer, Power, Governance and the WTO: A Comparative Institutional
Approach, in POWER AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (Michael Barnett & Raymond Duvall,

eds. 2004).
28 Steinberg, supra note 21.

29 While it is difficult to accurately measure power, relative market size offers the
best approximation of bargaining power in trade negotiations, with governments treating
foreign market opening and associated increases in export opportunities as a domestic
political benefit and domestic market opening as a cost. Id. Consequently, market
opening and closure are treated as the currency of trade negotiations. Id.
30 Id.
31 See generally JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 109-1 11 (2d ed.

1997) (comparing the new rule based system of the WTO after the Uruguay Round with
the prior power-oriented system of GATT).
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have been directly aimed at reducing the use of unilateral power
by the wealthy countries.32 Moreover, the new dispute resolution
architecture allows each member to hold other members
accountable for their commitments; this form of legalization has
replaced the negotiated settlement of disputes (which is inherently
power-based) with the level playing field of judicial review.33
We should not, however, jump too quickly to the conclusion
that in today's regime the relative power of countries is
unimportant. Clearly, as WTO members undertake negotiations to
work out the implementation of the GATS agreement 34 or in the
new Doha Round of multilateral negotiations," 5 member's relative
power continues to be an important force in determining the nature
of the obligations that are undertaken and avoided. In these
negotiations, the relative power of the members continues to shape
the negotiations, both in process and in outcome.3 6 If nothing else,
32 One of the achievements of the Uruguay Round of negotiations that ended in
1994 was a set of treaty provisions that were designed to limit the use of power to
influence commitments made in negotiations, whether in the context of dispute
resolution or in general negotiations. See generally WTO, Understandingon Rules and
Procedures, supra note 2 (seeking, via Article 23, to channel disputes between countries
concerning the obligations in the WTO treaties into the dispute settlement procedure);
WTO, Agreement on Safeguards, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs
_e/legal-e/25-safeg.doc (last visited Feb. 21, 2005) (prohibiting, through Article 11, the
use of unilateral action to seek voluntary restraints on trade between member countries).
33 WTO, Understandingon Rules and Procedures,supra note 2.
34 GATS, the General Agreement on Trade in Services, was completed as part of
the Uruguay Round agreements, but its implementation called for, and has led to,
additional negotiations for various service sectors.
See, e.g., http://www
.wto.org.lenglishltratop e/serv elserv-e.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2005). See OECD,
GATS: THE CASE FOR OPEN SERVICE MARKETS
(2002), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/50/50/2088515.pdf (last visited Feb. 21, 2005); OECD,
QUANTIFYING THE BENEFITS OF LIBERALIZING TRADE IN SERVICES (2003) available at

http://www.wwwl.oecd.org/publications/e-book/2203011E.pdf) (last visited Feb 21,
2005). For commentary on the defects in the negotiations over trade in services, see
Bernard Hoekman, Toward A More Balanced and Comprehensive Services Agreement,
in JEFFREY J. SCHOTI, THE WTO AFTER SEATTLE, 119 (2000) (reviewing difficulty of

achieving balanced concessions in services negotiations).
35 The Doha Round is the name given to the current round of multilateral
negotiations begun at the Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar. Developments during
the round are reported by the WTO at http://www.wto.org./englishltratop-e/dda-e/
ddae.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2005).
36 Thus, considerable attention is given to how the developing countries will be
involved in the negotiations in order to avoid prior procedural problems. See generally
SCHOTT, supra note 34, at 283 (discussing developing country dissatisfaction with
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the search for ways to put together bargaining coalitions, and the
counter-efforts to break up coalitions, shows that power remains
the central ingredient of lawmaking by negotiation.37 Moreover,
despite the efforts noted above, the WTO system has proven to be
ineffective at eliminating the resort to unilateral power when
powerful countries want to impose new obligations on others.3 8

Therefore it has proven difficult to address the power imbalance
between developed and developing countries even within the
WTO's current law-based system.
Although the legalization of the dispute resolution process is
often thought to be a benefit to developing countries,3 9 the reality

"Green Room" negotiations between industrial powers that excluded developing
countries).
37 The current Doha Round is driven by several coalitions of countries that speak
for members of the coalitions. Bernard Hoekman, Cancun: Crisis or Catharsis?,
available at http:l/www.sed.manchester.ac.ukidpmresearchevents/wbseminarlCancun
CatharsisorCrisis.pdf (last visited Feb. 21, 2005) (describing the coalitions and their
effect on the negotiations). The coalitions are overlapping and shifting, and WTTO
members frequently try to negotiate separately with members of a coalition in order to
influence the strength of the demands of the coalition. Id. See AMRITA NARLIKAR,
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: BARGAINING COALITIONS IN THE

SYSTEM (2003); JANE FORD, A SOCIAL THEORY OF THE WTO: TRADING
CULTURES (2003).
38 See generally Peter Drahos, Securing the Future of Intellectual Property:
Intellectual Property Owners and their Nodally Coordinated Enforcement Pyramid, 36
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. __ (forthcoming 2005) (describing the use of unilateral actions
and bilateral agreements to break coalitions and choose enforcement targets. The United
States has used bilateral and regional agreements in order to bring the countries more
line with its own domestic provisions, therefore bypassing some of the more flexible
provisions contained in the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS)). See generally Carlos Correa, Bilateralism in Intellectual Property:
Defeating the WTO System for Access to Medicines, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. _
(forthcoming 2005) (reviewing how United States negotiations with Central America
have resulted in an attempt to heighten intellectual property standards in developing
countries).

GATIWTO

39 See generally THE URUGUAY ROUND AND BEYOND: THE FINAL REPORT FROM THE
FORD FOUNDATION SUPPORTED PROJECT ON DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND THE GLOBAL

TRADING SYSTEM (1989) [hereinafter FORD FOUNDATION REPORT] (noting that benefits to
developing countries from a multilateral trading system depend largely on gains from the
disciplines of an effective rules-based multilateral system); T.N. SRINIVASAN,
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM: FROM THE GATT TO

THE URUGUAY ROUND AND THE FUTURE 57 (1998); Kofi Oteng Kufuor, From GATT to
the WTO: The Developing Countries and the Reform of the Procedures for the
Settlement of InternationalTrade Disputes, 31 J. WORLD TRADE 117, 132-140 (1997).
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is not so simple. There is ample evidence that the dispute
settlement system created under the Dispute Settlement
Understanding (DSU) 4° is not a meaningful source of power for
developing countries; 4 1 to the contrary, the system may
asymmetrically favor the developed countries.42 Small countries
often lack the incentive to seek redress. 43 The level of a country's
development still heavily influences the settlement of disputes
before litigation," and enforcement of obligations depends on
40 See supra note 2.

41 Busch & Reinhardt, supra note 2, at 719-20 (asserting that the new legalistic
architecture of the WTO offers little additional benefit to developing countries because
poorer countries have' not secured significantly greater responses under the DSU than
under the prior dispute settlement system).
42 Developing countries have difficulty effectively negotiating in the "shadow of
the law" because they face adversaries with an incentive to litigate fully, they often face
multiple parties, and they have fewer legal resources at their disposal. Marc L. Busch &
Eric Reinhardt, "Testing International Trade Law: Empirical Studies of GATT/WTO
Dispute Settlement," in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW:

ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ROBERT HUDEC 466 (Daniel M. Kennedy & James D. Southwick

eds., 2002) (finding that developing countries increased from 8 percent to 37 percent of
the defendant pool in the GATT versus the WTO eras). With less legal capacity and
higher transaction costs relative to the gains from winnings the case, their incentive to
settle cheaply is likely to be great. Id.; GREGORY SHAFFER, DEFENDING INTERESTS:
PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS IN WTO LITIGATION 157-158 (2003); Gregory Shaffer,
How to Make the WTO Dispute Settlement System Work for Developing Countries: Some
Proactive Developing Country Strategies in TOWARDS A DEVELOPMENT-SUPPORTIVE
DISPUTE

SETTLEMENT

SYSTEM

IN THE

WTO

(ICTSD

2003),

available at

http://www.ictsd.org/pubs/ictsdseries/resource-papers/DSU_2003.pdt) (last visited Feb.
21, 2005) (documenting problems that developing countries have in using the dispute
settlement system and their lack of use, and recommending reforms); Gregory Shaffer,
Recognizing Public Goods in WTO Dispute Settlement: Who Participates? Who
Decides? The Case of TRIPS and PharmaceuticalPatent Protection, 7 J. OF INT. ECON.
L. 459 (2004).
43 See generally Chad P. Bown, Participation in WTO Dispute Settlement:
Complainants, Interested Parties, and Free Riders (unpublished working paper, on file
with authors) (finding that the incentive to participate in a case is related to the amount
of affected exports, retaliatory ability, and legal capacity).
44 See Busch & Reinhardt, supra note 2, at 730. Although Australia and India had
nearly identical GDP's in 2000, their per capita income levels, and their resulting ability
to control the process of legal actions are quite different. Id. India, with a per capita
income level of US$ 459, would have a 41 percent chance of getting the average
defendant to concede, and Australia, with a per capita income level of US$ 23,837,
would have a 73 percent chance. Id. This disparity can be seen even among developing
nations. Id. For example, Chili and the Philippines have equal GDPs. Id. However,
holding other variables constant, Chile, with a per capita income of $5,000 (four times
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designing retaliation that imposes realistic costs on a nonAlthough the DSU has significantly
complying country.45
improved the WTO dispute settlement process for developing
country complainants by instituting a more timely "trial,"
removing the threat that a defendant could block a case, and
providing the option of appellate review (to improve consistency
and greater systemization), the reforms have also increased the
transaction costs of settling disputes.46
Whatever the reality now, over the last six decades developing
countries have had a healthy distrust of the GATT/WTO regime

and have maintained skepticism about the value of the WTO to
their own interests.47 Integrating developing countries into the
WTO regime has essentially been a task of finding a way to
incorporate the powerless into a multilateral system whose
benefits are distributed on the basis of power.48 This is required
that of the Philippines), would have a 60.5 percent chance of obtaining full concessions
from a typical defendant, whereas the Philippines would have only a 47.5 percent chance
in an otherwise identical case. Id.
45 See generally Naboth van den Broek, Power Paradoxes in Enforcement and
Implementation of World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement Reports, 37 J. WORLD
TRADE 127 (2003) (assessing the role of power in determining compliance with decisions
in dispute settlement).
46 Busch & Reinhardt, supra note 2, at 721-22 (observing that in moving from a
power-oriented system under the GATT to a more rule-oriented system under the WTO
and the DSU, in which legal preparation carries more weight in pre-Panel bargaining,
this new premium on legal capacity under the DSU is less burdensome to advanced
industrial states who already maintain large, dedicated, and permanent legal and
economic staffs to oversee WTO and trade law matters, whereas for poorer countries this
move compounds a traditional source of weakness, the lack of market size and therefore
retaliatory power, with a new one: legal capacity).
47 The problems of the small economies are explored in Frank J. Garcia, Trade and
Inequality: Economic Justice and the Developing World, 21 MICH. J. INT'L L. 975, 98588 (2000). See generally PETER GALLAGHER, GUIDE TO THE WTO AND DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES (2000) (providing an understanding of how developing countries work
within the WTO and offering case studies on how some developing country members are
making progress in working with the obligations and the benefits provided to them under
the WTO agreements); RICHARD L. BERNAL, THE INTEGRATION OF SMALL ECONOMIES IN
THE FREE TRADE AREAS OF THE AMERICAS, IX Policy Papers on the Americas, Study 1
(Center for Strategic and International Studies, Feb. 2, 1998) (examining, in a narrower
but relevant context, the issues surrounding the integration of smaller economies into the
Free Trade Area of the Americas); EMERGING MARKET ECONOMIES, GLOBALIZATION AND
DEVELOPMENT (Grzegorz W. Kolodko ed., 2003) (examining the development of
emerging market economies).
48 Garcia, supra note 47, at 985.
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not only to bring developing countries into the regime, and to
improve the universality of the regime, but also to maintain a
power balance in the regime as it matures.49 The GATT/WTO
regime is simultaneously strong and fragile. Its long run stability
depends on insuring that all members continue to believe that the
benefits of belonging to the WTO outweigh the costs, and this
means that the powerless must continue to feel that they are better
off within the organization than outside of it."
Historically, the primary issue between developed and
developing countries has been whether the principle that governed
GATT was to be one of formal equality (despite the differences
between developed and developing countries) or real equality recognizing that formal equality between countries that are
unequal is not equality. 5 Although the initial U.S. position on this
question was that formal equality should be the rule, eventually
the United States had to succumb to the view that if it wanted the
GATT/WTO system to be attractive to all countries it would have
to bend toward real equality.52 The developing countries had no
interest in participating in a system that did not acknowledge the
special position of poor countries, and the insistence of the United
States that poor countries make the same sort of "concessions" as
wealthy countries and accept the same sort of obligations made
membership unattractive.5 3 Over time, the benefits of universality
began to outweigh the desire for a uniform approach to rights and
obligations, and the United States, as well as the rest of the
developed world, began to understand the importance of creating
special rules that would acknowledge the different status of the
poorer countries.5 4 As Robert Hudec has written:
Id. at 987.
50 Id. at 987, 993.
49

Id.
This is the central theme in ROBERT E. HUDEC, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE
GATT LEGAL SYSTEM 17 (1987). See also FORD FOUNDATION REPORT, supra note 39, at
1, J (summarizing how tensions between developed and developing countries over trade
matters accumulated in the post-war years) and at 15-23 (exploring the development
strategies, political and other factors underlying protectionism, and multilateral
negotiation that contributed to these tensions).
53 Gerald M. Meier, The Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations and the
Developing Counties, 13 CORN. INT'L. L. J. 239,253 (1980).
54 FORD FOUNDATION REPORT, supra note 39, at 37-38.
51

52
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The history [of developing country involvement in the
GATT/WTO system], begins with a legal relationship based
essentially on parity of obligation, with only very limited,
almost token, exceptions. Over the years, the relationship has
gravitated, in seemingly inexorable fashion, towards the onesided welfare relationship demanded by the developing
countries 55
.

Ultimately, the WTO implemented the concept of Special and
Differential treatment - the notion that within the GATT/WTO
system, poor countries would be given treatment that reflected
their poverty, and thus their relative lack of bargaining power.56
Two types of special treatment developed.57 From the standpoint
of avoiding obligations, commitments made by developed
countries would be implemented more slowly, or less severely, for
developing countries, and developing countries would not have to
make the same concessions as industrial country members.58 From
the standpoint of receiving special privileges, the industrial and
developing countries negotiated the GSP program.5 9 Under this
program, developed countries were allowed and encouraged to
55

HUDEC,

supra note 52, at 4.

56 FORD FOUNDATION REPORT, supra note 39, at 23-29 and app. C (describing how

the rules for special and differential treatments for developing countries evolved in the
GATT). Briefly in 1965, following the 1958 Haberler Report and as a result of
developing countries' initiatives in the early and mid-1960's, Articles 36, 37, and 38
were added to GATT as Part IV (Trade and Development); they are devoted solely to the
problems of developing countries. Id. Article 36 of GATT, for example, recognizes the
new principle of non-reciprocity between developed and developing countries. Id. at
993; see generally Garcia, supra note 47, at 988 (describing the evolution of special and
differential treatment).
57 FORD FOUNDATION REPORT, supra note 39, at 39.

Special and differential

treatment was comprised of two broad elements: trade preferences in developed country
markets and special rights to maintain barriers at home. Id.
58 Id.

59 Meier, supra note 53, at 240. The GSP was instituted during the Tokyo Round
of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, which ended in 1979. Id. Developing countries had
long demanded that industrially advanced countries grant tariff preferences on
manufactured and semi-manufactured goods imported from poorer countries, while
industrial countries had often balked at giving trade preferences for a variety of reasons.
Id. Initial work was undertaken under the auspices of UNCTAD, the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development, through two UNCTAD conferences. Id. A
Specialized UNCTAD Trade and Development Board, established in 1970, developed
the framework that led to the successful incorporation of the GSP program at the WTO.
Id.
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give preferential market access to the developing countries by
lowering tariffs for developing countries below the level of tariffs
for developed countries. 6°
In the absence of any official authorization, preferences given
under the GSP program to developing, but not developed,
countries would have violated the prohibition on discriminatory
treatment contained in the "cornerstone" most favored nation
(MFN) obligation of Article 1 of GATT. 6' Accordingly, the
members created the necessary exception to the MFN requirement
to allow such preferences in two ways: First, by way of a waiver
of Article 1, known as the 1971 GSP Decision,62 and later by way
of a 1979 decision 63 that became known as the 1979 Enabling
60 Yusuf, supra note 16, at 488-90. After the GSP system was launched in the
WTO in 1971, The Trade Negotiations Committee established a "Framework" group in
November 1976 during the Tokyo Round because the developing countries were
demanding a permanent legal basis for preferences in the GATT system. Id. The
purpose of this Framework Committee was to "negotiate improvements in the
international frameworks for the conduct of world trade, particularly with respect to
trade between developed and developing countries and for differential and more
favorable treatment to be adopted in such trade." GATT, Doc. MTN/17, 1 (Nov. 8,
1976) cited in Yusuf, supra note 16, at 488-490. One of the major achievements of this
group was the Text of the Enabling Clause, thus establishing a permanent legal
framework. Id. at 488-490.
61 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S.
1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]. Article 1: 1 prohibits discrimination between
members, stating that "any advantage, favor, privilege, or immunity granted by any
member to any product originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded
immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the
territories of all other contracting parties." Id. Therefore, under this provision, the lower
tariffs given to one country must be given to all member countries. Id.
62 See Contracting Parties, Generalized System of Preferences, B.I.S.D. 18S/24, a
(June 25, 1971) [hereinafter 1971 Waiver]. The 1971 GSP Decision granted a special
GATT waiver providing the initial authorization to enable developed countries to grant
preferences to developing countries without granting the same preferences to other
members:
Without prejudice to any other Article of the General Agreement, the provisions
of Article I shall be waived for a period of ten years to the extent necessary to
permit developed contracting parties, subject to the procedures set out
hereunder, to accord preferential tariff treatment to products originating in
developing countries and territories with a view to extending to such countries
and territories generally the preferential tariff treatment referred to in the
Preamble to this Decision, without according such treatment to like products of
other contracting parties. Id.
63 GATT Contracting Parties, Decision on Differential and More Favorable
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Clause.' The Enabling Clause continues to provide the legal basis
for the MFN exception allowing countries to give the preferences,
thus serving as the instrument that determines whether preference
programs are lawful.65
In sum, the GSP system was instituted in the hope that
developing countries could use the trade preferences to increase
their national wealth and thereby increase their interest in, and
allegiance to, the GATT/WTO regime.6 6 The underlying theory
was that the preferences would hasten the economic development
of less developed countries and would increase the power that
these countries would derive from their own economic strength.6 7
This, in turn, would help to restore and maintain balance within
the system.68 In this way, the preferences can be seen as a
reflection of, and reaction to, the economic and political situation
in the recipient countries. 69 Nonetheless, the GSP system has
unique characteristics that make it an imperfect tool for achieving
that goal.7 °
B. Power and the GSP System
Four characteristics of the GSP system inform our analysis.
First, each donor country determines, within the context of the
Enabling Clause, what preferences it will give and under what
circumstances; accordingly, the U.S. GSP program is unlike the
program of the European Community (EC), and Japan's program
is different still. 7' The lack of coordination of the programs gives
Treatment, Reciprocity, and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries, Nov. 28,
1979, GAT[ B.I.S.D. 203 (1980) [hereinafter Enabling Clause].
64 See generally Yusuf, supra note 16, at 488-489; Meier, supra note 53, at 249;
Bela Belassa, The Tokyo Round and the Developing Countries, 14 J. WORLD TRADE L.
93,97 (1980).
65 See Enabling Clause, supra note 63.
66 See Belassa, supra note 64, at 97-107.
67 U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee
on Trade, Committee on Ways and Means, House of Representatives, Letter to the

Chairman, p. ., June 2001 [hereinafter GAO REPORT].
68 Id.

69 See id. at 2.

70 See id. at 4.
71 Id. For example, the U.S. program offers duty-free entry for the products under
its preference scheme, while the EC's program provides for either duty free entry or
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the preferences a scattershot appearance, given that the products
granted preferential treatment by the United States may not get
preferential treatment from the European Community. It also
means that the terms and conditions under which preferences are
given are quite diverse.72
Second, the donor countries do not have to give the
preferences - they are purely donative - and recipient countries

have no legal right to insist on the preferences.73 Accordingly,
donor countries are free to withdraw their preferences at any time
without fear of retribution, and with no resulting legal remedy for
the recipient countries. 74 The preferences are considered gifts, and
whether donor countries continue those preferences depends
largely on whether the long term goal of the program-to integrate
the developing countries into the WTO system--continues to be
reduced tariffs. Id. Further the EC's program applies to more countries than does that of
the United State's. Id. at 5. Both the United States and EC established GSP programs in
the early 1970s, offering trade preferences to only 100 developing countries. Id.
Presently, the United States offers nonreciprocal trade preferences to 151 countries and
territories, while the EC offers preferences to 171 countries. Id. Moreover, unlike the
United States, the EC has also expanded the number of products that are eligible for the
preferences. Id.
72 Id. at 5-7.
73 The 1971 Waiver made this non-commitment explicit: "Noting the statement of
developed contracting parties that the grant of tariff preferences does not constitute a
binding commitment and that they are temporary in nature." See 1971 Waiver, supra
note 62.
See also, 1982 REPORT BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF UNCTAD,
ASSESSMENT OF THE RESULTS OF THE MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, UNCTAD
Doc. T/BI778/Rev., 29, 1176 (1982) (finding that the key provision of the Enabling
Clause that allows more favorable treatment to developing countries also imposes no
obligation on developed countries to accord this differential treatment). One portion of
the Appellate Body's opinion in EC-Preferences appears to be to the contrary, because
the Appellate Body said that "the characterization of the Enabling Clause as an exception
in no way diminishes the right of Members to provide or to receive 'differential and
more favorable treatment."' AB REPORT, supra note 4, 98. In context, because the
Appellate Body is discussing the nature of the Enabling Clause as an exception of the
MFN provision, this statement does not affirm the right of any country to insist that
another country give it preferences. Id. This passage only confirms that right of
countries to insist that countries giving preferences do so under the authority, and within
the limits of, the Enabling Clause, which establishes the right to violate the MFN
provision. Id.
74 GAO REPORT, supra note 67, at 11-12. Many donor countries, of course, enact
their preferences for a period of years, giving the programs some stability, subject only
to provisions that allow the preferences to be withdrawn in sectors where imports
account for a large share of the market. Id.
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important and worthwhile in their eyes.75
Third, and correlatively, the recipient countries do not have to
accept the preferential treatment under the program.76 If the
preferences do not meet their needs, or are otherwise undesired,
the recipient countries are free to reject them and plan their affairs
as if the preferences did not exist.7 7

Finally, the fourth characteristic of the GSP programs follows
from the fact that preferences are gifts.78 Soon after GSP
programs were initiated, donor countries began making the
preferences conditional on various factors, requiring the recipient
countries to meet one or more tests as a condition of receiving the
preferences.79
Over time, the donor countries imposed
increasingly stringent conditions for the receipt of the preferential
treatment, requiring the recipient country to change fundamental
national policies in order to get the preferences.8 ° These
conditions were of two types. The so-called "negative conditions"
are those conditions that a country must meet in order to qualify
for GSP preferences in the first place.8" The GSP program of the
United States is built around negative conditionality, denying GSP
preferences to countries that, for example, practice communism
(with exceptions), engage in unlawful expropriation, are involved
with terrorism, or fail to meet certain standards for labor or
intellectual property rights.82 Other conditional GSP programs
involve so called "positive conditionality," where countries that
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78

Id.

79 See infra notes 125-42 and accompanying text. The conditions presently
imposed by the United States include requirements concerning the recipient countries'
policies with respect to labor rights and intellectual property rights. See Office of the
United States Trade Representative, Executive Office of the President, U.S. Generalized
System of Preferences Guidebook, 23-24 (Mar. 1999), at http://www.ustr.gov/reports/
gsp/index.html. For a comprehensive study of the effect of the U.S. labor policy
conditions on labor rights in developing countries, see Lance Compa & Jeffrey S. Vogt,
Labor Rights in the Generalized System of Preferences, 22 CoMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J.
199 (2001).
80 See, e.g., GAO REPORT, supra note 67, at 11-12.
81 Howse et al., Internet Roundtable, supra note 12, at 245.
82 Id.
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meet certain conditions are given extra preferences over and above
those that are given generally to developing countries.83 The
preferences challenged by India in the European Conditions case
are examples of positive conditionality. 84
On one level, the conditions that donor countries placed on
GSP recipients were not surprising. Some conditions were
designed simply to insure that the program was not abused;
recipient countries must, for example, follow stringent "country of
origin" requirements to make sure that the goods were made in,
and not just transshipped through, the recipient country.85
Moreover, the conditions were not unnatural; they reflected the
fact that those who give gifts often feel as if they should be able to
control the recipient in various ways.86 As the conditions placed
on recipient countries grew in number and severity, however, and
as the conditions appeared to move further and further away from
the rationale for giving preferences in the first place, conditional
preferences began to be a source of friction between donor and
recipient countries.87
The friction between developed and developing countries over
GSP programs comes from several sources.88 The value of the
preferences has eroded as countries lowered their tariffs to all
WTO members in successive rounds of negotiations. Lower levels
of general tariffs meant that preferential treatment did not give
83

Id.

84 Id.

85 See, e.g., Comprehensive Review of the Generalized System of Preferences,
Report by the UNCTAD Secretariat 39, UN Doc. No TD/B/C.5/63 (Apr. 9, 1979), in UN
TDBOR, Operation and Effects of the Generalized System of Preferences 19, Doc.
TD/b/C.5/71 (1981) (regarding conditions that donor countries place on GSP recipients);
UN Conference on Trade and Development, 9 Sess., Midrand Declaration and a
Partnership for Growth and Development 12, UN Doc. TD/377 (May 24, 1996).
85 Howse et al., Internet Roundtable, supra note 12.
86 Id.
87 Id.

Recently, a group of eminent persons
88 See GAO REPORT, supra note 67.
appointed by the Director-General of the WTO to mark the tenth anniversary of the
WTO has criticized the GSP programs because the conditions erode the benefits of the
programs, because the programs reflect the interests of donor, not donee nations, and
because the programs have become quite complex and lack stability. See The Future of
the WTO, Addressing Institutional Challenges in the New Millenium, (Peter Sutherland,
Chair, 2004).
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developing countries much of a competitive advantage.89 The
preferences were often given on products of little interest to
exporters in the developing countries, and were withheld on
products that the countries could have successfully exported. 90 If
recipient countries become too successful, and for example, lose
developing country status, donor countries may withdraw
preferences. Additionally, preferences can be withdrawn from
individual goods when they reach certain threshold amounts. 9
In the context of the frictions generated by these issues, India's
challenge to the EC program presented both legal and political
issues, and resulted in great interest in the EC-Conditional
Preference case.92 A threshold issue is whether the conditions
under which preferences are given should be subject to judicial
control, or whether conflicts over the conditions are susceptible
89 GALLAGHER, supra note 47, at 112-114. There has been an erosion of preference
margins beginning with the Tokyo Round, where an average cut of one third in industrial
country tariffs reduced preference margins, and again in the Uruguay Round where
preference margins were cut by another 40 percent. Id. Further, while developed
nations have begrudgingly granted preferences, due to a rise of New Protectionism since
the Tokyo Declaration in 1973, the effectiveness of these preferences has always been
limited by the use of exemptions, tariff quotas, and escape clauses. Meier, supra note
53, at 240; see also FORD FOUNDATION REPORT, supra note 39, at 39 (finding that while
developing countries have benefited from the GSP, those benefits have been
counteracted by small preference margins, limited product coverage, and the graduation
of many developing countries); see Horst Kohler, Working for a Better Globalization,
Address at the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (Jan. 28, 2002) (transcript
available at http:l/www.imf.org/extemal/np/speeches/2002/012802.htm (last visited Feb.
21, 2005)).
90 See generally GALLAGHER, supra note 47 (discussing the practical application of
preferences).
91 Id. See also GAO REPORT, supra note 67 (regarding preferences and their
privileges).
92 See Daniel Pruzin, WTO Panel Rejects EU Linking GSP Benefits With Policies
on Environment, Labor,Drugs, WORLD NEWS (Vol. 20, No. 36) 1490, 1491 (2003). The
initial substantive and political importance of this case is highlighted by the fact that
seventeen developing countries and the U.S. requested to be third parties. See European
Communities - Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing
Countries - Constitution of the Panel Establishedat the Request of India, WT/DS246/5
(Mar. 6, 2003). In its third party submission, the United States stated that it desired to
participate in this proceeding because of the importance of the issues presented. Id. The
United States understood the systemic implications of the dispute between the EC and
India. European Communities - Conditions for the Granting of Trade Preferences to
Developing Countries - Third Party Submission of the United States, WT/DS246 (Apr.
30, 2003).
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only to political resolution. 93 To some, the nature of the
preference programs makes controversies about their operation
largely political, not legal, questions.94 Even if issues surrounding
the GSP program were subject to judicial review-that is, even if
the Enabling Clause were interpreted to consist of standards that
GSP programs must meet in order to amount to a permitted
violation of the MFN principle-further problems would arise. 95
As a matter of legal interpretation, the Appellate Body had to
construe the Enabling Clause to determine the contours of the
legal rules that constrain GSP programs, and then determine
whether any conditional preferences that ran afoul of the Enabling
Clause might be held to be lawful under the general defensive
provisions of Article XX of GATT.9 6

The legal issues raised in these inquiries are difficult enough,
but they must also be understood in light of the political
relationship between developed and developing countries.
Because industrial countries are not required to give preferences, 97
any attempt by the Appellate Body to interpret the Enabling
Clause to restrict the conditions under which the preferences are
given could result in the loss of the preferences altogether. A
country that is not allowed to shape its own preference program
may feel inclined to simply abandon the program, willing to face
the displeasure of the developing countries in order to enforce its
own sense of control. 98 As a result, the interpretive challenges
presented by conditional preferences must be undertaken with the
recognition that any interpretation will affect the political
relationship between developed and developing countries, the
willingness of developed countries to grant the preferences, and
the loyalty of the developing countries to the systemic values of
the WTO system. 99
93

See Daniel Pruzin, supra note 92, at 1491.

94 See, e.g., Howse et al., Internet Roundtable, supra note 12, at 246-48; Howse,
India's WTO Challenge, supra note 12, at 387-399.
95 See Howse, Back to Court After Shrimp/Turtle, supra note 12, at 1367-78.
96 GATI', June 1986, Art. XX (allowing countries to avoid their WTO obligations
in order to meet specified non-trade goals, such as protection of public health or the
environment, provided that the country is able to meet stringent jurisprudential hurdles).
97 See supranote 38 and accompanying text.
98 AB REPORT, supra note 4.

99 See id.
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The GSP program in general, and its continuation through the
Enabling Clause, are both products of political compromise. Like
many WTO provisions, the legal framework of the GSP system is
steeped in ambiguity, with a vast range of issues on which there
has been no true meeting of the minds. It may be true, as
Professor Howse has pointed out, that developed countries never
accepted the notion that they could not pick and choose the
conditions on which they would implement their GSP programs,°°
but it is equally true that developing countries have never accepted
the notion that any condition put on the programs is permissible.'°
In fact, the developing and developed countries have never been
able to decide on more than the general principles of the Enabling
Clause, and have had no basis for agreeing on the details of
multilateral oversight of the program.' 2 The question thus
becomes whether these disparate perceptions of the GSP program
should invite or repel the neutral involvement of the Appellate
Body.' O3 If involvement is necessary, then how should the
Appellate Body use its interpretive powers? The EC-Conditional
Preferences case posed both of these questions
III. The Problem of Conditional Preferences
The conditions placed on preferences by donor countries mean
100 See Howse, India's WTO Challenge, supra note 12, at 393. Even the evidence
on this point is ambiguous. Professor Howse cites a statement from a trade diplomat that
"it was tacitly agreed that any donor country would have the powers to extend the
preferential treatment to any country or to withdraw this treatment if there should be any
valid reason for this in the opinion of the preference-giving country." Id. Aside from the
fact that this personal opinion is far removed from the normal evidence of negotiating
intent, the statement leaves ambiguous the role of the donor state in determining the
"valid reason" for withholding benefits. It could very well be that the drafters
contemplated that the reasons for withholding benefits were collectively assumed while
the determination of whether a legitimate reason was in fact present was to be
determined by each country. Naturally, when a condition is legitimate-as when the
preference depends on goods coming from that country-the donor country should be
given great discretion in making that determination. That does not necessarily give the
donor country total discretion to determine which conditions are legitimate and which
are not.
101 See Howse, Back to Court after Shrimp/Turtle, supra note 12 (discussing
developing and developed countries inability to decide on more than the general
principles of the Enabling Clause).
102 Id.
103 Id.
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that the preferences are essentially conditional gifts. Therefore, to
gain a better understanding of the role GSP preferences play in the
WTO system, it is helpful to explore the general legal approach to
conditional gifts. Conditional gifts are those given on the
condition that the recipient change its behavior in some way. For
example, donors to universities give money for particular
purposes, making those purposes a condition of the gift. A donor
might, for example, give a gift to support the teaching of history,
conditioned on the inclusion of a certain theory of history. People
planning their estates often make their bequests conditioned on the
behavior of the beneficiary of the gifts; a person might leave a
bequest to a favored nephew, conditioned on the nephew going
The government often
into a drug rehabilitation program.
conditions the benefits that it makes available on certain behavior
in the recipient, making, for example, the grant of welfare
conditioned on the recipient seeking a job. In all the examples,
like preferences under the General System of Preferences, the gift
is dependent on some change in behavior.
In most such cases, of course, as long as the condition that is
placed on the gift is germane to the gift's purpose, the conditions
are not troublesome. We expect donors to be able to determine the
purposes of their gifts and make sure that the purposes are in fact
fulfilled. Because the donor need not make the gift, and because
the recipient need not accept the gift, the conditions put on most
gifts ensure that the joint expectations of the donor and recipient
are observed. Indeed, any legal restraint on such gifts appears at
first glance to be paradoxical. Arguably, conditional gifts are
better than no gifts at all; accordingly, the right to withhold the gift
and confer no benefit on the recipient would seem to imply that
the donor should also have the right to reduce the benefit by
imposing some condition on the gift. The greater right (to deny
the gift in the first place) would seem to imply the lesser right (the
right to condition the gift as the donor wants).
Yet, legal systems often intervene to review and control the
conditions that donors put on their gifts. It is common, for
example, to strike down government benefits that are conditioned
on the recipient giving up a constitutional right that the recipient
would otherwise have.'4 For example, it is impermissible for the
104 LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 681 (2d ed. 1988).
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government to condition unemployment compensation on the
recipient's agreement to work on the Saturday Sabbath,' 0 5 or to
condition public broadcasting subsidies on the broadcaster's
agreement to avoid editorial comment. 10 6 Similarly, courts strike
down conditions imposed on bequests when those conditions are
against public policy. 10 7 A donor may not condition a gift on the
recipient's agreement to marry within the faith or to get a
divorce. 108

In short, mature legal systems recognize limits on the power of
donors to do indirectly-through conditional gifts-what they
may not do directly, and they recognize the autonomy of recipients
by striking down conditional gifts that would threaten that
autonomy in important ways.
The reason for these limitations is directly related to the central
concern of the analysis here: the division of power between donors
and recipients. In her magisterial exploration of the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditionsj ° Kathleen Sullivan has identified the
balance of power as the central theme in cases striking down

105 See generally Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136

(1987) (concluding that that the Unemployment Appeals Commission's
disqualification of the employee from receipt of benefits violated the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, applicable to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment).
106 See generally F.C.C. v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984)

(determining that restrictions on free speech in public broadcasting were upheld
only if the restrictions were narrowly tailored to further a substantial
governmental interest).
107 For examples where courts struck down conditions because they were against
public policy, see Estate of Robertson v. U. S., 903 F 2d. 1034 (5 Cir. 1990); In re Estate
of Kirkendall, 642 N.E. 2d 548 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994); In re Estate of Mank, 699 N.E. 2d
1103 (Ill. App.1998), appeal denied, 181 111.2d 497 (1998); In re Liberman, 18 N.E. 2d
658 (N.Y. 1939). See generally Ian Johnson, Conditions Not to Dispute Wills and the
Inheritance Act of 1975, 25 LIVERPOOL L. REV. 71 (2004) (discussing conditions on

bequests that are against public policy).
108 See generally Helms v. Helten, 290 N.W. 2d 876 (1980) (striking down
condition on gift to son "as long as he refrains from marrying or associating with in any
way his common law wife").
109 Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARv. L. REV. 1415
(1989); see generally Jason Mazzone, The Waiver Paradox, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 801

(2003) (attempting to reconcile the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions on
government benefits with the waiver of constitutional rights in criminal cases).
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conditions placed on government grants or subsidies. ° The
notion that government may not condition its gifts in ways that
interfere with important constitutional liberties does "not simply
protect individual rightsholders piecemeal... [it] also help[s]
determine the overall distribution of power between governments
classes
of
generally,
and among
and
rightsholders
''
The distribution and use of power from a
rightsholders. .
systemic perspective is at the heart of understanding limitations on
conditional gifts." 2
Admittedly, the power of courts to strike down conditions on
government grants or subsidies as unconstitutional is rooted in the
positive rights guaranteed by the Constitution, while the WTO
system gives recipient countries no such explicit claim to be left
alone." 3 Similarly, the power of courts to strike down conditions
on bequests is rooted in well-defined notions of individual
autonomy that can be reversed by democratic legislation if
wrongly decided. Arguably, in the international realm, where
there are no well-defined principles with which to determine
whether any country has the right to be free from interference
from any other government, there is no basis for determining when
conditions placed on gifts violate "global public policy" or
otherwise interfere with the distribution of rights and
responsibilities among nations in any defined ways.
Yet we should not overestimate the importance of those
differences. The international system is created around norms
110 Cases striking down conditions placed on private gifts are more likely to refer to
public policy limitation on conditions rather than to power-based analysis of such
conditions. See generally Johnson, supra note 107 (discussing conditions on bequests
that are against public policy). Nonetheless, preserving the autonomy of the recipient to
make important decisions without having to worry about the power exercised by the
donor's promise of riches is not far from the surface of these cases. Id.
111Sullivan, supra note 109, at 1490.
112 For example, power is at the heart of the theory of coercion that is so often
invoked when unconstitutional conditions are struck down. Thus, the U.S. Supreme
Court has found that the attachment to a privilege is coercive when "[i]n reality, the
carrier is given no choice, except a choice between the rock and the whirlpool,-an
option to forego a privilege which may be vital to his livelihood or submit to a
requirement which may constitute an intolerable burden." Sullivan, supra note 109, at
1430 (quoting Justice Sutherland in Frost Trucking Co. v. R.R. Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583
(1926)).
113 See generally Sullivan, supra note 109 (discussing unconstitutional conditions).
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governing the behavior of one state to another and it is grounded

in the right to be left alone-the basis of sovereignty. 14 The
countries of the world have developed recognizable modes of
behavior toward one another that provide a basis for recognizing
the limits to which power can be used in the international
system. 115 It is not far fetched to suggest that the WTO system
must pay attention to those modes of behavior and implicit rights
when it addresses the question of which conditions placed on GSP
preferences are permissible and which ought to be beyond the
pale.
Moreover, two of the basic norms of the international
community-the prohibition against discrimination between
countries and the prohibition of discrimination between nationals
and non-nationals-are explicit in WTO treaties. 1 6 Certainly,
WTO members have the right to rely on a promise of equal
treatment as a basic norm that will govern relationships between
'
members. 17
If nothing else, the survival of the WTO regime itself will
depend on the ability of the system to maintain balance between
the interests of the WTO members,118 as well as continued faith by
all the members that their interests are not subject to arbitrary or
norm-violating behavior of other states. The GSP system was
designed to provide engagement and balance that are essential to
the long run success of the community.11 9 It is hard to imagine
See,

e.g.,

RABKIN, WHY SOVEREIGNTY MATTERS 2 (1998)
("Sovereignty denotes independence. A sovereign state is one that acknowledges no
superior power over its own government .. ") and John Jackson, Sovereignty Modern,
114

JERERMY

A New Approach to an Outdated Concept, 97 Am. J. Int'l L. 782 (2003) (reviewing

various meanings of the concept of sovereignty). For one author's perspective on the
relationship between sovereignty and the WTO see Gerhart, supra note 1, at 48-55.
115 International law thus serves as both a source of limitations on state interference
with other states, and as a source of obligations from each state to the international
community. See generally IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
(5th ed. 1998) and AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW (THIRD)
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 102, cmt. B (1987) (discussing the
norms that make up customary international law).
116 GATT, supra note 61, Art. I and Art. III.
117 See Peter M. Gerhart, Slow Transformations: The WTO As a Distributive
Organization, 17 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1045 (2002).
118 Id.

119 Id. at 1053-65.
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that WTO members, both developed country members and
developing country members, did not intend that the GSP system
would become a source of stabilization, rather than destabilization,
for the community.
The Enabling Clause should therefore be understood as
embodying the systemic values and relational norms that allow the
WTO regime to flourish. Undoubtedly, the Enabling Clause needs
to be definitely interpreted. It should not, however, be interpreted
with the assumption that because GSP preferences are gifts, the
donor country may impose any conditions it wants on the behavior
of the recipient country. Instead, the Enabling Clause needs to be
understood as an important framework for working out the
relationship between states with power and those without.
IV. The Decision in European Communities - Conditional
Preferences
A. The European Community's GSP Program
The EC-ConditionalPreferences case dealt with one facet of
the GSP plan that the European Community adopted in January
2002120 (EC Council Regulation). Europe's plan provided general
tariff preferences to all developing countries (hereinafter the
"General Arrangements").12 1 Under this Plan, Europe granted
"non-sensitive" products duty-free treatment (zero tariffs) and
"sensitive" products a tariff rate that was lowered by 3.5 percent
points below the generally applicable MFN rate. 122 In addition to
the general arrangements, Europe provided additional programs
that were available only to certain developing countries. First,
under the Special Incentive Arrangements, Europe gave an
additional margin of preference to developing countries that the
European Commission determined had complied with specified
120 Council Regulation 2501/2001 of 10 December 2001, Applying a Scheme of
Generalized Tariff Preferences for the Period from 1 January 2002 until 31 December
2004 [hereinafter EC Council Regulation]; see The EU-LDC Network, EU-LDC Themes
- Social, Environmental & Welfare Aspects of Trade Policy (discussing the relationship

between this plan and the European Communities prior plan) available at
http://62.58.77.238/themes/socialwelfare/socialwelfare-policy.php (last visited Feb. 21,
2005).
121 EC Council Regulation, supra note 120, at art. l(2)(a).
122 Id. art. 7.
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labor or environmental standards. 123 Qualified countries would
benefit from a reduction of 5 percentage points on top of the 3.5
percent point reduction on "sensitive goods" under the General
Arrangement-a total of 8.5 percentage points. 124 Under the labor
incentives, the additional preferences were available for all
products from qualified developing countries, 12 while under the
were
environmental incentives, the additional preferences
126
products.
forest
tropical
of
available only on imports
Second, under the Drug Arrangements, Europe gave additional
preferences to countries certified as having programs to combat
drug production and drug trafficking; 127 for recipient countries the
tariffs on "sensitive products" were reduced to zero. 12 Under a
third program, Europe gave even more favorable treatment to
those countries designated 129by the United Nations as least
developed countries (LDCs).
Significantly, Europe adopted different procedures for granting
123 Id. art. 1(2)(e).
124 Id. art. 8(2).

125 Id. art. 14(2). The special incentive arrangements for the protection of labour
rights may be granted to a country the national legislation of which incorporates the
substance of the standards laid down in ILO [International Labor Organization]
Conventions No. 29 and No. 105 on forced labour, No. 87 and No. 98 on the freedom of
association and the right to collective bargaining, No. 100 and No. 111 on nondiscrimination in respect of employment and occupation, and No. 138 and No. 182 on
child labour and which effectively applies that legislation. Id.
126 Id. art. 21(2). The special incentive arrangements for the protection of the
environment may be granted to a country which effectively applies national legislation
incorporating the substance of internationally acknowledged standards and guidelines
concerning sustainable management of tropical forests. Id.
127 Id. art. l(2)(b) & (c).
128 Id. art. 10.

1. Common Customs Tariff, ad valorem duties on products which, according to
Annex IV, are included in the special arrangements to combat drug production
and trafficking referred to in Title IV and which originate in a country that
according to Column I of Annex I benefits from those arrangements shall be
entirely suspended... Id.
129 Id. art. 40. This provision was a continuation of the Regulation (EC) 416/2001
(the EBA Regulation) that the European Council adopted in February 2001, granting
duty-free access to imports of all products form LDC's except arms and munitions,
without any quantitative restrictions. See User's Guide to the European Union's Scheme
of Generalised Tariff Preferences (Feb. 2003), at http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/gsp/
gspguide.htm.
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the additional preferences to countries with appropriate
environmental and labor policies than it did for countries with
Under the Special Incentive
appropriate drug policies. 130
Arrangements, a developing country could apply for the additional
preferences on sensitive products by showing that its regulatory
policy complied with certain labor and environmental standards. 3 '
The applicant country would make a request to the Community,
show that it fulfilled the relevant conditions set out under the
particular special incentive arrangement, undergo an examination
of the situation in its territory, and agree to monitor the application
13 2
and compliance with the stated labor or environment standard.
Compliance was demonstrated by showing adequate measures to
formulate legislation regarding the stated standards and the
commitment to implement, monitor, and enforce those
'
standards. 33
By contrast, Europe made no provision in the drug incentive
program for countries to apply for the special preferences; nor did
it state what standards the applicant country would have to meet to
Instead, the European
qualify for the drug incentives. 131
Commission itself identified the countries that it would favor with
these preferences; 135 it gave the drug preferences to members of
130 EC Council Regulation, supra note 120.
131 Id. art. 8(1). See also UNCTAD Secretariat, Quantifying the Benefits Obtained
by

Developing

Countries

From

The

Generalized

System

of

Preferences,

UNCTAD/ITCD/TSB/Misc 52 (Oct. 7, 1999), at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/poitc
dtsbm52.en.pdf.
132 EC Council Regulation, supra note 120, arts. 15(1) & 22(1). See also Bartels,

supra note 15, at 509.
133 EC Council Regulation, supra note 120, arts. 15(2) & 22(2).
134 Steve Charnovitz has pointed out that the incentive preferences for drug-fighting
countries were not really conditional because Europe did not specify the basis for
providing the special preferences. See Howse et al., Internet Roundtable, supra note 12,
at 239. Although his factual statement is accurate, our view is that these preferences
should be viewed as conditional under conditions that were never revealed. There was
some basis for awarding these preferences, even if it was a secret or impermissible
reason.
135 EC Council Regulation, supra note 120, art. 10 (referring to Column I of Annex
I for a list of the beneficiary countries). In fact, although the Appellate Body did not
mention it, Pakistan was added to the list of beneficiary countries soon after the terrorist
attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001. See, e.g., Indian Wins GSP
Case Against European Commission at the WTO, FIEO News, (Jan. 2004) at

http://www.fieo.org/fieonews/2004/january/wto.html.

This was widely seen as a way to

2005]

POWER AND PREFERENCES

the Andean Community, the Central American States and
Pakistan, 136which gave a competitive advantage to producers from
those countries. Accordingly, although all developing countries
were given duty free access on non-sensitive products, only the
twelve Drug Arrangement countries were given duty free access
Moreover, Europe included some
on sensitive products.' 37
products in the Drug Arrangement that were not included in the
General Arrangement; 3 80n those products, the non-Drug
Arrangement countries would have to pay the full tariffs, while the
Drug Arrangement countries would pay no tariff. The selectivity
of the Drug Arrangement had long been controversial among the
developing countries,13 9 and it became the focus of India's
challenge. 140
reward Pakistan for its cooperation in the subsequent attacks by the United States British
coalition on the terrorists in Afghanistan. Id.
136 Under Column I of Annex I, the European Commission designated Bolivia,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru,
Pakistan, El Salvador and Venezuela as the beneficiary countries of the special
arrangements for drug production and trafficking. EC Council Regulation, supra note
120, Annex I, Col. I.
137 Id. art. 7.1-7.2.
138 Id. art. 8-10.
139 In fact, the European Union's earlier programs of trade concessions for
combating drug production had been the target of two complaints at the WTO. Daniel
Pruzin, India Seeks WTO Talks with EU over Labor, Drugs Clauses in GSP Program, 19
INT'L TRADE REP. 456 (2002). In October 2000, Brazil complained about EU tariff
concessions on soluble coffee imported from several of its South American neighbors
because of their efforts to combat drugs, while at the same time "graduating" Brazil's
coffee exports from the GSP scheme. Id. This dispute was later resolved through a
bilateral deal giving Brazil duty-free access for up to 10,000 metric tons of soluble
coffee exports to the EU. Id. In December 2001, Thailand requested WTO consultations
with the EU to address its complaint regarding unfair treatment of its exports arising
from the special tariff arrangement for drugs. Id. Thailand's complaint is similar to
India's because it is also excluded from the tariff arrangement even though it is doing as
much or even more than the beneficiary countries in fighting illegal drugs. Id.
140 India initially challenged each of the conditional features of the EC program, but,
during consultations, dropped its broad attack and focused its arguments on the
additional preferences that were connected with drug programs. European Communities
- Conditionsfor the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries - Report of
the Panel, at 1, 1.5, WT/DS246/R (Dec. 1, 2003) [hereinafter EC-Conditional
Preferences, Panel Report]. This is not a concession by India that the special
arrangements for environmental and labor rights are beyond challenge. Id. As India
noted in its decision to drop those claims, no preferences had been granted under the
special incentive arrangements for the protection of the environment and only one
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B. The Decision

The Appellate Body's ruling on this challenge is quite narrow,
dealing only with the issue of whether Europe violated the
requirement of "non-discrimination" in GSP programs by granting
Pakistan, but not India, special privileges under its drug
program. '41 As one commentator has noted, because the special
drug preferences were "only available to a 'closed list' of twelve
without an administrative procedure for
beneficiaries,"
recognizing new beneficiary countries, and without stated criteria
special preferences, the European plan was an
for awarding the
"easy target." '42 Nonetheless, the methodology used by the
Appellate Body is worth studying in some detail because such
study reveals the Appellate Body's broader views aboutthe legal
implications of conditional GSP programs.
The Appellate Body first held that, in order to qualify for an
exception to the MFN obligation under the Enabling Clause, the
preferences had to be given on a general, non-discriminatory, and
non-reciprocal basis.'4 3

This holding was itself not obvious.'"

Although the evidence is clear that, as originally envisioned, the
GSP Preferences were intended to meet this standard, 45 the
country, Moldova, had been accorded preferences under the incentive arrangements for
the protection of labor rights. Id. India reserved its right to bring separate new
complaints on the environmental and labor arrangements if the European Communities
were to apply them in a manner detrimental to India's trade interests or if the European
Communities were to renew them after the lapse of its current General System of
Preferences Scheme on December 31, 2004. Id.
141 AB REPORT, supra note 4, 190.
142 Howse et al., InternetRoundtable, supra note 12, at 241-42.
143 AB REPORT, supra note 4,

147.

144 Robert Howse, for example, mounted a sustained attack on the notion that the
Enabling Clause required GSP preferences to be "general, non-discriminatory, and nonreciprocal." See Howse, India's WTO Challenge, supra note 12, at 388-393 (arguing
that the key language of the Enabling Clause does not create a legally enforceable
standard). His position was softened, but still critical, after the Appellate Body ruled to
the contrary. See Howse et al., Internet Roundtable, supra note 12, at 246 (arguing that
Appellate Body should have supported its analysis with reference to the object and
purpose of the Enabling Clause).
145 The Preamble to the 1971 GSP Decision clearly confirms, as was contemplated
in both the First and Second UNCTAD Reports that "unanimous agreement was reached
in favor of the early establishment of a mutually acceptable system of generalized, nonreciprocal, non-discriminatory preferences, beneficial to developing countries ...
1971 Waiver, supra note 62, Preamble.
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Enabling Clause itself did not make this standard clear. This
standard was mentioned only in footnote 3 of the Enabling Clause,
which provided that the preferences would be those "[a]s
described in the decision of 1971 relating to the establishment of
the general, non-reciprocal, and non-discriminatory system."14' 6
The Appellate Body wisely ruled that this was not merely a
descriptive reference to the original program, but instead
requirements of the program as
incorporated the substantive
147
approved.
originally
Having found that the GSP Program must be "general, nonreciprocal, and non-discriminatory" in order to qualify for the
exemption from the Article I MFN requirement, the Appellate
Body went on to discuss and apply the requirement that GSP
programs be "non-discriminatory" as between the potential
recipients of the programs.1 48 The Appellate Body set forth two
general principles. First, it made it clear that "non-discriminatory"
does not mean that no distinctions can be drawn between the
programs offered to various countries;14 9 second, it determined that

similarly situated countries must be treated similarly. 50 Formally
equal treatment among developing countries is not required, and a
granting country may group countries into categories that have
different characteristics, but similar countries must be dealt with

146

Enabling Clause, supra note 63, at n.3.

147

AB REPORT, supra note 4,
Id.

148

146-47.

AB REPORT, supra note 4, 156 (stating "it does not necessarily follow, however,
that 'non-discriminatory' should be interpreted to require that preference-granting
countries provide 'identical' tariff preferences under GSP schemes to 'all' developing
countries").
154 (stating that "[iut is clear from the ordinary meaning of 'non150 Id.
discriminatory,' however, that preference granting countries must make available
identical tariff preferences to all similarly-situated beneficiaries"); see also 173 which
states:
We conclude that the term 'non-discriminatory' in footnote 3 does not prohibit
developed country Members from granting different tariffs to products
originating in different GSP beneficiaries .... In granting such differential
tariff treatment, however, preference-granting countries are required by virtue
of the term 'non-discriminatory' to ensure that identical treatment is available to
all similarly-situated GSP beneficiaries ....
149
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similarly. 5 '
The reason for this interpretation is straightforward. As the
Appellate Body recognized in its earlier Shrimp-Turtle decision, 5 2
the equal treatment of countries that are not the same can be
To treat different countries equally it is
discriminatory. 15'
necessary not only to avoid formal discrimination but also to take
into account the different circumstances that make formally equal
So the restriction on nontreatment damaging to a country.'t

The Appellate Body cited sources in general international law for these
propositions. See id. 1153, n. 318.
152 United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,
Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS58/AB/R (Nov. 6, 1998) [hereinafter US-Shrimp];
see also United States-Section 337 of The Tariff Act of 1930, 36th Supp. BISD 3454
(1990) (stating that under national treatment discrimination, formal equal treatment can
be discriminatory while differential treatment can be lawful if it is not unfavorable
treatment).
153 Indeed, this is the basis for the GSP program in the first place-the recognition
that treating poor countries the same as rich countries would in fact discriminate against
the poor countries. See generally Yusuf, supra note 16, at 492 (noting that the principle
of equality does not impose a legal obligation on States to treat all other States equally in
those areas where rights and duties are regulated on the basis of contractual obligations,
and therefore discrimination or differential treatment of other states in matters of trade
was not unusual) Id. Yusuf believes the only way to assure non-discriminatory
treatment lies in the negotiations of treaties, such as GATT, that were based on the MFN
Clause. Id. at 492. On the other hand, Professor Regan is "surprised and dismayed by
the ease with which academics say that 'discrimination' includes ...similar treatment of
entities differently situated." See Howse et al., Internet Roundtable, supra note 12, at
263. His objection, however, appears to be institutional rather than jurisprudential. He
states that although the notion "might make sense in some idealized world. . . in the
actual world... [the statement] is much more troublesome." Id. The Appellate Body's
continued reference to the principle reflects their view that formal equality is too relaxed
a principle in a world where inequality is rife, and they draw on well-recognized
authority for the proposition. See AB Report, supra note 4, at 153, n. 318. Perhaps
Professor Regan's concern might be alleviated if we recognize that the Appellate Body
does not seem intent on requiring positive changes in law; they do not require, for
example, that a country affirmatively give greater preferences to poorer countries. Id.
Rather, they seem to be contemplating that when a country seeks to deal with a problem
like drug enforcement or nearly extinct species, it does so by taking into account not only
the extent to which the problem is the same in various countries but also the extent to
which the problem is different in different countries. Id.
154 See US-Shrimp, supra note 152, at 164 (stating that "it is not acceptable in
international trade relations for one WTO Member to use an economic embargo to
require other Members to adopt essentially the same comprehensive regulatory program,
to achieve a certain policy goal, as that in force within that Member's territory without
taking into consideration different conditions which may occur in the territories of those
151
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discrimination cannot be a requirement of formally equal
treatment; it must be a requirement that the granting country treat
equal countries equally and unequal countries unequally.
This standard of non-discrimination, however, requires us to
understand which characteristics of a country matter when we
determine whether countries are similarly situated.
If, for
example, a GSP donor country may consider a country's political
system when deciding what preferential treatment to give, it could
have one preference system for functioning democracies and
another preference system for oligarchic democracies. If the
granting country were allowed to take religion into account, then it
could have one preference system for Islamic countries and
another for Christian countries. The discrimination standard
requires that the basis for treating countries differently be
specified.
When the Appellate Body looked to see what criteria a donor
country may use to determine whether it could, or must, treat
countries differently, it saw that the standard was contained within
the Enabling Clause itself.'55 According to the Enabling Clause,
the preferences are to be "designed and, if necessary, modified, to
respond positively to the development, financial and trade needs of
the developing countries."' 56 This is the standard that determines
the basis for differentiating between the preferences given to
particular countries-the classification must bear some
relationship to the different developmental, financial and trade
needs of different classes of countries. 5 7 Under this standard, a
other Members") and 165 (stating that "we believe that discrimination results not only
when countries in which the same conditions prevail are differently treated, but also
when the application of the measure at issue does not allow any inquiry into the
appropriateness of the regulatory program for the conditions prevailing in those
exporting countries").
155 See AB Report, supra note 4,
156

165.

Enabling Clause, supranote 63, 3(c).

157 The development emphasis of the Enabling Clause is apparent in other
provisions as well. For example, Paragraph 9 of the Enabling Clause calls for a review
of its provisions "bearing in mind" the need "to meet the development needs of
developing countries." Id. 9. This is, of course, consistent with the program that was
originally created through negotiations at UNCTAD. Agreed Conclusions of the Special

Committee on Preferences, UNCTAD Doc. TD/B/330, part II. The Agreed Conclusions
of the Special Committee on Preferences stipulated that the preferences would be
exclusively for developing states and territories and that no non-developing third county
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preference system that distinguishes between countries on the
basis of their form of government or their religion would be
sustained as "non-discriminatory" only if it could be shown that
the form of government or religion had some relationship to the
developmental, financial or trade needs of the country."'
As the Appellate Body said, "the expectation that developed
countries will 'respond positively' to the 'needs of developing
countries' suggests that a sufficient nexus should exist between, on
the one hand, the preferential treatment provided under the
respective measure authorized [by the Enabling Clause] and, on
the other, the likelihood of alleviating the relevant 'development,
financial, [or] trade need."' 5 9 Accordingly, different preferences
for different countries are permissible if the donor country
classifies recipients according to their different developmental,
financial or trade needs.
Applying this standard in EC-ConditionalPreferences might
have led the Appellate Body to evaluate Europe's basis for
classifying some countries as especially worthy of receiving
preferences because of their drug fighting programs, while finding
other countries unworthy under that criterion. Arguably, the
Appellate Body could have examined the relationship between
programs for fighting drugs and the development, financial, and
trade needs of developing countries, and then could have asked
whether Pakistan's anti-drug programs were really better (along
some relevant measure) than those of India. However, because the
panel from which the appeal was taken had made no findings on
these subjects, 6 ' and neither party had raised this issue, the
Appellate Body decided the case on the assumption that a donor
country can give different levels of preferences to countries that
effectively fight drug traffic.' 6
The Appellate Body nonetheless struck down Europe's
preference program as applied because it did not offer sufficient
procedural assurances that the program would be applied nonwas to invoke its rights to MFN treatment with a view towards obtaining these same
preferences. Id.
158 AB REPORT, supra note 4, 166.
159 Id.
160

165.

Id. 130.

161 Id.
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discriminatorily.162 Here, the Appellate Body drew on a judicial
technique reminiscent of the one it used in the Shrimp-Turtle
decision, by setting up a series of procedural hurdles that any GSP
donor country must face before it can sustain its differential

treatment between countries based on their developmental,
financial and trade needs. 163 Because the conditional privileges
that Europe gave, "may be found consistent with the 'nondiscriminatory' requirement in footnote 3 only if the European
Community proves, at a minimum, that the preferences granted
under the Drug Arrangement are available to all GSP beneficiaries
that are similarly affected by the drug problem,"'64 Europe also
had to adopt practices that would ensure that it met that standard.
First, Europe had to provide a mechanism for adding to the list
of beneficiary countries; for, without such a mechanism, there
would be no way for countries that came into compliance with the
conditions to show that they too were entitled to the extra
privileges.165 Europe had provided such a mechanism with respect
to its special incentives for labor and environmental standards, but
not with respect to the drug standards. 16 6 In particular, Europe
"gives no indication of how the beneficiaries under the Drug
Arrangement were chosen or what kind of considerations would or
could be used to determine the effect of the 'drug problem' on a
particular country [and no] indication as to how the European
Communities would asses whether the Drug Arrangements
provide an 'adequate and proportional response' to the needs of
167
developing countries suffering from the drug problem."
Accordingly, its program was discrimnatory within the meaning
of the Enabling Clause.
Second, Europe had not set any clear prerequisites or objective
criteria that would guide the determination of which countries are
within the similarly situated class. 168 Without such a set of
162 Id.

187-88.

163 Id.

164 AB REPORT, supra note 4, 180.
165 Id. 182.
166 Id.

167 Id. The reference to "adequate and proportional response" is from one of the
submissions made in the case by the European Community. Id. n. 386.
168 Id. 183. The Appellate Body had earlier stated that "broad-based recognition of
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criteria, developing countries would be unable to determine
whether they should seek to be qualified for the privileges, and
dispute panels charged with reviewing the preference conditions
would have no way of determining whether the donor countries'
decisions were based on development, financial, or trade needs of
the potential recipients.
Finally, just as there were no criteria for adding a country to
the list of special beneficiaries, there were no criteria for removing
a country. 169
This too could result in discrimination, for
continuing preferences for a country that does not deserve them
under the relevant standard would be as discriminatory as denying
them to a country that does.
In short, the European system "itself gives no indication as to
how the beneficiaries under the Drug Arrangements were chosen
or what kind of considerations would or could be used to
determine the effect of the 'drug problem' in a particular
country.' 170 The lesson of the case is clear: when a developed
country exercises its power, it must follow procedures that help to
ensure that it is not abusing its power. Requiring these procedures
is necessarily a reflection of the fact that determining conditions
on which preferences will be granted directly affects the welfare of
these developing countries. In order to guarantee that these
decisions are not discriminatory, the donor must provide objective
standards and follow procedural mechanisms in making their
decision.
V. Legal Implications for Other Conditional GSP Programs
Although the Appellate Body's holding in EC - Conditional
Preferences was quite narrow, the Appellate Body revealed a
methodology that allows us to understand how they will likely
analyze future challenges to conditions placed on GSP programs.
We set forth this understanding in this section, providing an
analytical framework for assessing which conditions are likely to
be upheld and which are likely to be overturned. This legal
analysis does not, however, provide a complete understanding of
a particular need, set out in the WTO Agreement or in multilateral instruments adopted
by international organizations, could serve as such a standard." Id. 163.
169 Id. 183.
170 AB REPORT, supra note 4, 183.
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how the Appellate Body is likely to act in future cases, because
conditional GSP programs present the Appellate Body with
political, as well as legal, challenges. Accordingly, in the next
section of the article, we explain how our analysis of the law
affecting conditional GSP programs also puts the Appellate Body
in a position to monitor power relationships between countries and
enhance developing country participation in the international
trading system.
The three requirements of GSP programs - to be "general,
non-discriminatory, and non-reciprocal" - are closely aligned with
one another.'71 In particular, each is likely to be understood in
light of the two major interpretive messages of the EC-Conditional
Preferences case: First, that the conditions under which GSP
benefits are to be given must relate to the circumstances of the
recipient countries, not the circumstances or welfare of the
granting country; and, second, that the terms are to be construed in
light of the provisions of the Enabling Clause that restrict and
shape GSP programs.'
Although we take up each of the three
terms separately, we do it in a manner that demonstrates how they
are interconnected.
A. Interpretationof the Term "General"
The terms "general" and "non-discriminatory" largely overlap,
because the former term is a subset of the latter. As the Appellate
Body explained, preferences must be general in the sense that they
may not be confined to a subset of developing countries that have
a particular historical, cultural, political or geographic relationship
with the granting country. "'Accordingly, the preferences that
some European countries had with their former colonies are
71 4
ineligible for the MFN exemption under the Enabling Clause.
This provision constitutes a subset of the general prohibition
against discriminatory preferences because it states that the
preference programs may not set up classifications that
discriminate among recipients on any of these circumstance that
would make the benefits special-that is, based on historical,
171

Enabling Clause, supra note 63.

172 AB REPORT, supra note 4.
173

Id. 155.

174 Yusuf, supra note 16, at 488.
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cultural, political or geographic relationships-rather than
general.'75 Such ties are not a permissible basis for discriminating
in favor of, or against, recipient countries.
Naturally, issues of proof remain. The identification of
classifications that relate to these special considerations appears
not to be difficult, for they are all capable of identification using
the normal methods of proof. Classifications that appear on their
face to favor countries because of these relationships undoubtedly
will be struck down as de jure discrimination.' 76 In addition,
complaining countries will also be able to prevail if they can
prove, from the way that the classifications apply in practice, that
facially neutral classifications nonetheless amount to de facto
discrimination on one of the impermissible criteria.'77 This
analysis will draw on well-understood tests under WTO law for
challenging defacto conditions.' 78
B. Interpretationof the Term "Non-Discriminatory"
Provided that the classification used by the donor country does
not discriminate on the basis of historical, cultural or geographic
relationships, the Appellate Body must then determine if other
grounds are permitted for classifying some developing countries as
privileged beneficiaries-that is, for making benefits conditional
on inclusion within the privileged group. Several grounds for
permissible discrimination are clear. First, donor countries may
discriminate based on a country's level of development; Europe's
special privileges for least developed countries seem to be beyond
reproach because the Enabling Clause explicitly permits special

175 Id.

176 See generally Appellate Body Report, Canada-Measures Affecting The Export
of Civilian Aircraft-Recourse by Brazil to Article 21.5 of the DSU, WT/DS70/AB/RW,
(Aug. 4, 2000) (setting forth method for determining whether subsidies are contingent on
exporting); Thailand-Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes,
GATT B.I.S.D. (37th Supp). at 204 (Nov. 7, 1990) (reviewing Thai regulations of
cigarettes that were non-discriminatory on their face but discriminatory as applied);
Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8-1 1/AB/R, (Nov. 1, 1996) (determining
whether de jure non-discriminatory tax was nonetheless de facto discriminatory because
it was applied "so as to afford protection").
177 Yusuf, supra note 16.
178 Id.
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benefits for least developed countries."'
Moreover, the Enabling Clause also suggests that as countries80
develop, they can be asked to take on more and more conditions. 1
This implies that donor countries may classify recipient countries
by level of development and, accordingly, grant different levels of
privileges. This is inherent in the graduation clause in paragraph 7
of the Enabling Claus, which explicitly provides that:
Less-developed contracting parties expect that their capacity to
make contributions or negotiated concessions or take other
mutually agreed action under the provisions and procedures of
the General Agreement would improve with the progressive
development of their economies and improvement in their trade
situation and they would accordingly expect to participate more
of rights and obligations under the
fully in the framework
81
Agreement.'
General
Although this graduation clause suggests that recipient
countries may be treated differently on the basis of their level of
development, this is not unlimited permission to increase
conditions as a country becomes wealthier. This permission for
donor countries to discriminate on the basis of the level of
development explicitly depends on conditions being "mutually
agreed" upon.' 82 At a minimum, this will put the Appellate Body
in the position of determining whether the granting country has
bargained in good faith with the recipient country to ensure that
the heightened conditions actually reflect the improvement in the
economic and trade position of the recipient countries and are not
179 Enabling Clause, supra note 63, 2(d) (authorizing donor countries to grant
special benefits to least developed developing countries).
180 Id.

Id. 7 (emphasis added). The 1982 Secretary-General of UNCTAD, however, in
his assessment of the results of the Multilateral Trade Negotiations, noted some
apprehension regarding the graduation clause because although it was "vaguely worded,"
it establishes a legal precedent within the GATT system by requiring the developing
countries to accept greater obligations as their economic situation improves. 1982
Report by the Secretary General of the UNCTAD, Assessment of the Results of the
MultilateralTrade Negotiations, UNCTAD Doc. T/B/778/Rev. 1, at 29, 1179. Moreover,
the report also foresaw that this graduation concept could have far-reaching
consequences for the future WTO system if its implementation were to allow developed
countries to discriminate among developing countries in a unilateral and arbitrary
manner. Id.
182 AB REPORT, supra note 4, at 81.
181
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inconsistent with the continuing developmental, financial, and
trade circumstances of the country.
Aside from permissible discrimination based on a country's
level of development, no a priori judgments can be made
regarding which bases of discrimination are consistent with the
requirements of the Enabling Clause. Whether a donor country
can discriminate on the basis of the labor or environmental policy
of a recipient country, for example, must be left to case-by-case
adjudication. 183 Several principles, however, are likely to guide
the Appellate Body in this inquiry.
First, it is unlikely that the Appellate Body will accept
generalized statements that link a country's differential treatment
to development conditions in the recipient countries. As the
Appellate Body said, "need cannot be characterized... based
merely on an assertion to that effect;" rather, the donor country
must refer to "[b]road based recognition of a particular need, set
out in the WTO Agreement or in multilateral instruments adopted
by international organizations" '8 4 In other words, the Appellate
Body is unlikely to accept the general argument that fighting drug
traffic is good for a country or for international trade. Instead, it is
likely to insist that the donor country shows with some specificity
the relationship between the conditions that the recipient countries
must meet, and the development, financial and trade needs of the
country. This notion is reinforced by the requirement, read by the
Appellate Body into the Enabling Clause, that the granting country
must rely upon "objective criteria" when determining whether an
applicant country is entitled to receive benefits.' 85
Moreover, the Appellate Body may review the connection
between the policies that donor countries require and the
development, financial, and trade needs of recipient countries. As
the Appellate Body said,
[A] sufficient nexus should exist between, on the one hand, the
preferential treatment provided under the respective

183

Id. at 12.

184 AB REPORT, supra note 4. In a footnote to that paragraph, the Appellate Body
noted that the EC finds support "in several international conventions and resolutions that
have recognized drug production and drug trafficking as entailing particular problems for
developing countries." Id. n. 335.
185 Id. 183.
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treatment.., and, on the other, the likelihood of alleviating the
relevant "development, financial [or] trade need." In the context
of a GSP scheme, the particular need at issue must, by its nature
be such that86 it can be effectively addressed through tariff
preferences. 1

Indeed, the purpose of specifying the relationship between the
conditions and the developing need of the recipient country must
be to allow this nexus to be evaluated.
Undoubtedly, this inquiry into the relationship between the
donor's conditions and the development interest of the recipient
country will require the Appellate Body the undertake a difficult
analyses to determine which policies stimulate growth and which
policies do not. One can imagine that a scheme that conditioned
benefits on the recipient country having a certain kind of
intellectual property regime, for example, is likely to be
contentious, since the link between intellectual property and
growth is itself contentious.' 87 On the other hand, conditions that
require the recipient country to follow well-developed policies for
sustainable development or worker health and safety are likely to
be given presumptive weight by the Appellate Body. 88 In these
considerations, the Appellate Body is likely to be swayed not only
by the reigning ideology of developmental economics, but also by
any developmental plan that the recipient country has in place.
Conditions that reflect the plans drawn up by developing countries
are more likely to be seen as in that country's interest than are
plans that are created by the granting country.
186

Id. T 164.

187 Compare REPORT OF THE COMM'N ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS, INTEGRATING

INTELLECTUAL

PROP. RIGHTS & DEV. POLICY (2002), available at http://www.

iprcommission.org./graphic/documents/final-report.htm (expressing skepticism about the
contribution of intellectual property to development and arguing that developing
countries should carefully tailor their intellectual property systems to their development
needs) with ROBERT M. SHERWOOD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT (1990) (claiming that intellectual property is good for development
because it attracts foreign investment and technology transfer). The evidence is
collected and reviewed in KErrH MASJUS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE
GLOBAL ECONOMY (2002).
188 See Bartels, supra note 15, at 652 (stating that conditioning preferences on
standards that are already binding on developing countries can be the basis for GSP
conditions, but insistence on non-binding standards that the developing county does not
have the technical or economic capacity to meet will be impermissible).
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As a second general principle, it is likely that the Appellate
Body will more easily uphold conditions if the recipient country is
required to expend resources to meet the conditions, and if the
preferences are designed to compensate the recipient country for
those expenditures. Some programs that are good for a country in
the long term, such as environmental and labor protections, are
nonetheless expensive to finance in the short term. Preference
programs that are designed to compensate a country for those
expenses would be in the interests of the recipient country, and
would therefore meet the applicable standard (even if conditioning
general preferences on labor and environmental rights alone would
not). Accordingly, preferences that serve as carrots to allow the
recipient country to offset the cost of policy that is good for the
country in the long run will probably be upheld.
For this reason, the Appellate Body is likely to approve extra
preferences that go beyond those generally available for countries
in a certain class if the extra benefits offset obligations that the
recipient country is undertaking in order to advance its own
development. Even here, however, the Appellate Body is likely to
police closely the conditions on which the extra privileges are
given in order to make sure that the value of the extra privileges is
comparable to the burdens that the recipient country is
undertaking. Privileges that are small in relation to the cost to the
recipient country, and that require conditions that reduce the
financial, trade, and/or development position of the recipient
country are not likely to be allowed.
Third, the Appellate Body is likely to uphold conditions that
seek to insure that the benefits of preferential treatment are
actually translated into benefits for the people of the country, and
that they are not siphoned off into wasteful or corrupt practices.' 89
No donor country should be required to grant preferential benefits
unless it has some assurance that the money is used for the
purpose for which it was given. 190
C. Requirement of "Non-reciprocal"
Reciprocity among the WTO members is a foundational

189 See supra Part III.
190 Id.
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principle of the WTO regime.' 91 The stipulation that benefits be
non-reciprocal is a reflection of the special nature of the exception
that is granted to the MFN requirement-the central expression of
the notion that GSP programs are gifts, not exchanges. 192 The
recipient country may not be required to give anything of value to
the granting country as a condition of receiving the benefits.'93
Placing conditions on the receipt of privileges is permissible as
long as they benefit the recipient country and not the donor
country; if the recipient country is not giving anything of value to
the donor country, the privileges are then non-reciprocal.' 94
At a minimum, the requirement of non-reciprocity means that
the granting country may not require the recipient country to lower
tariff or non-tariff barriers in order to get benefits. The GSP
program is expected to exist outside of the normal exchange of
market access concessions. In fact, no GSP program that we know
of conditions the benefits on giving the granting country market
access.
However, the requirement of non-reciprocity extends further.
The GATT/WTO system has long followed the practice of
requiring reciprocity in all of its commitments; that is the essence
of the "single undertaking" that requires WTO members to
subscribe to all the obligations that are contained in multilateral
agreements.' 95 To limit the requirement of non-reciprocity to
trade-like concessions would allow the granting country to exact
other promises of value to the granting country that would make
the benefits costly. Any condition that requires the recipient
country to do something that is not in its interests in order to

191 See, e.g., HuDEC, supra note 52, at 4 (noting a history "based essentially on
parity of obligation"); see generally PATRICK Low, TRADING FREE: THE GATT AND U.S.
TRADE POLICY 29 (1993) (discussing notions of fair trade and reciprocity, why they are
sought through GATT tariff negotiations, and the difficulties these goals present);
Michael K. Young, Lessons From the Battle Front: U.S.-Japan Trade Wars and Their

Impact on the Multilateral Trading System, 33 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REv. 735, 762

(2001) (exploring facets of the right to seek reciprocal trade concessions).
192 Enabling Clause, supra note 63, 5.
193 Id.

Id.
195 See generally Low, supra note 191 (discussing notions of fair trade and
reciprocity, why they are sought through GATT tariff negotiations, and the difficulties
these goals present).
194
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"compensate" the granting country for giving the preferences
makes the benefits non-reciprocal.
This reading is not only drawn from the logic of the Appellate
Body opinion in EC-Conditional Preferences, but is also
confirmed by the negotiating history of the GSP system itself. For
example, the first UNCTAD Report said that "developed countries
... should not, in granting these or other [trade] concessions,
196
require any concession in return from developing countries."'

This broad view of non-reciprocity-the prohibition on developed
countries requiring any concessions-was then incorporated into
Paragraph 5 of the Enabling Clause, which provides that "the
developed countries do not expect the developing countries, in the
course of trade negotiations to make contributions which are
inconsistent
with their individual development, financial, and trade
97
needs."1
This, of course, will require the Appellate Body to engage in
the same kind of analytical question about the impact of the
conditions on the recipient country that it undertakes when it
determines whether the basis on which the granting country
differentiates between developing countries is acceptable.
Given this analysis, we can discern the framework for

196 Principle 8 of Recommendation A.I1 in Final Act of the First United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (Geneva: UNCTAD, Doc E/COMF.46/141,
1964), Vol. 1 at 20 (emphasis added). The Generalized System of Preferences originated
in 1964 at the first UNCTAD, and the Conference, although recognizing that
international trade should be conducted to the mutual advantage of Member States on the
basis of most-favored nation treatment, nevertheless settled upon this non-reciprocity
principle. Id. Likewise, at the second UNCTAD, this commitment to non-reciprocity by
developing countries was once again recognized in Resolution 21(I)'s Agreed
Conclusions. The Agreed Conclusions recognized "the unanimous agreement in favor of
the early establishment of a mutually acceptable system of generalized, non-reciprocal,
non-discriminatory preferences which would be beneficial to developing countries."
Agreed Conclusions of the Special Committee on Preferences, UNCTAD Doc.
TD/B/330, part II.
197 Enabling Clause, supra note 63, 5 (emphasis added). Although this section of
the Enabling Clause expresses an expectation rather than a legal requirement, because
the expectation refers to the nature of the reciprocity that is expected in GSP programs, it
is an appropriate indication of the meaning of the term "non-reciprocal." Id. Further,
this same paragraph of the Enabling Clause requires then that developed Contracting
Parties "shall not seek, neither shall less-developed countries be required to make,
concessions that are inconsistent with the latter's development, financial and trade
needs." Id.
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analyzing conditions that granting countries impose on developing
The
countries before they can get preferential treatment.
conditions must be non-discriminatory in that they classify
countries on the basis of their developmental, financial, and trade
needs and treat equally situated countries equally. They must also
ensure that the conditions that serve as a prerequisite for the
preferences are tailored to help the developing country meet these
specific needs. Under this framework, the Appellate Body is
likely to uphold positive conditionality198 (i.e. "extra" preferences
that are designed to finance developing country investment in
certain policy changes) when those preferences can be seen as
compensation for the country undertaking the required policy
changes. Positive conditions are less likely to impose a cost on the
recipient country, and they ensure that the donor country pays for
any benefit that it gets from the recipient country's change in
Negative conditionality, the condition of any
policy. '"
preferences on changes in policy,2 °° is likely to be more
problematic unless there is an objective relationship between the
conditions required for getting the preferences and the needs of the
GSP program (such as country of origin requirements) or the
development, financial, and trade needs of the developing country.
Even within this general framework, however, the Appellate
Body has large interpretive flexibility, For example, what burden
will a donor country have to demonstrate that the conditions it
imposes meet the development, financial, and trade needs of the
recipient countries? How are those conditions distinguished from
conditions that require the recipient country to give something of
value to the donor country that is not in their ingterest? Even
aside from these questions, the Appellate Body must determine
whether the donor country has met the kind of procedural hurdles
that are an intricate requirement of the ability to impose conditions
or classifications on recipients: the requirement that the donor
country articulate the standards to be employed, that it specify the
relationship between the conditions and the interests of the
198 See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
199 Other commentators agree with this assessment. See Howse et al., Internet
Roundtable, supra note 12, at 240, 245 (concluding that positive conditionality is likely
to face fewer hurdles than negative conditionality).
200 See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
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recipient country, that it provide procedures by which recipient
countries can show that they qualify for the special privileges, and
that it engage in good faith discussions about the relationship
between the conditions it imposes and the ends that it is allowed to
pursue.2 °'
For these reasons, the Appellate Body has a great deal of
interpretive space; it can apply the framework one way or the
other, increase burdens of proof, heighten or lower the procedural
hurdles, or impose even more stringent controls on the ways in
which donor countries use conditional preferences. It is relevant,
therefore, to develop a sense of the ways in which the Appellate
Body is likely to use its interpretive freedom on a case-by-case
basis.
VI. The Role of the WTO Appellate Body
The Appellate Body has proven to be deliberative and
systematic in its interpretive work in an important and creative
way: the Appellate Body situates its interpretive task in the context
of the WTO regime as a whole, and in terms of the relationship
between the WTO system and other manifestations of international
law.2°2
Within the WTO context, the Appellate Body is
consciously creating a jurisprudence of treaty interpretation that
relies on a consistent set of analytical techniques for matching
means and ends and for understanding the relationship between
various treaty provisions. In addition, the Appellate Body is
conscious of the relationship between the WTO regime and the
other international law regimes with which the WTO must
interact.20 3 Although adhering in name to the Vienna Convention
on the Interpretation of Treaties, the Appellate Body has found
enough flexibility in that document to allow it to think
201

See AB REPORT, supra note 4.

This is evident in the opinion in EC-ConditionalPreferences itself. As one
commentator has said, "the most striking feature of this AB report is how ambitious and
self-confident it is laid out." Howse et al., Internet Roundtable, supra note 12, at 255.
See also, Sol Picciotto, The WTO's Appellate Body Legal Formalism as a Legitimation
of Global Governance, 18 GOVERNANCE (publication forthcoming, 2005)
(acknowledging the Appellate Body's formalism and reliance on legalisms, but
suggesting that the Appellate Body could more forthrightly engage in policy
discussions).
203 Picciotto, supra note 202; Howse et al., supra note 12.
202
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systemically while at the same time proceeding on a case-by-case
basis .204
This creative and systemic deliberation is an essential
characteristic given the nature of WTO lawmaking and the
institutional environment in which the Appellate Body is
embedded. Although the covered agreements are quite dense in
some respects, their language is hardly self-applying and they
contain numerous interpretive puzzles; not only are the treaty
terms generally undefined, but the treaties also contain significant
gaps.2"5 Moreover, the decisions of the Appellate Body are not
easily reversed, and therefore have a finality of almost
constitutional import.0 6 Despite provisions allowing for treaty
amendments and waivers without consensus, 207 in practice
members who want to reverse a decision of the Appellate Body
must do so in the context of ongoing negotiations, which means
that treaty amendment gets caught up in the time-consuming,
intricate, and expensive work of treaty negotiation.2 8 When
judges interpret a statute, the legislative body that created the
statute can review the interpretation and, normally, reverse it by a
simple majority vote if the interpretation is inconsistent with
Congressional intent (either originally or in light of the impact of
the interpretation as it is applied). 209 To date, members of the
204 Picciotto, supra note 202; Howse et al., supra note 12.
205 For example, the treaties are silent on the issue of what nexus one country must
show between its interests and the environmental policy of another country before it
imposes trade restraints to induce that country to change its environmental policies.
Although the conventional assumption among trade experts was that one country had no
legitimate interest in the processes by which other countries made products, that
understanding was neither explicit in the treaties, nor inherent in the nature of the issues
with which the treaties dealt. In US-Shrimp, the Appellate Body implicitly refused to
apply the process/product distinction to preclude one country from expressing its interest
in another country's process policies, thus exposing a gap in the scope of the treaties.
US-Shrimp, supra note 152. Moreover, because of the politically sensitivity of the nexus
issue, the Appellate Body pointedly refused to answer the issue in the context of that
case as well. Id.
206 See generally WTO, Understanding on Rules and Procedures,supra note 2, art.
3.1.
207 See Peter M. Gerhart, Reflections: Beyond Compliance Theory - TRIPS as a
Substantive Issue, 32 CASE W. RES. J.INT'L L. 357, 382 (2000).
208 Id.
209 Id.
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WTO have reversed none of the decisions of the Appellate Body
through new negotiations.21
Further, the Appellate Body exercises compulsory jurisdiction
and, unlike many national judicial bodies, has developed no
"political question" jurisprudence that would allow it to refuse to
make decisions on issues that are more properly considered
political, rather than interpretive.21' It has no way of avoiding the
difficult issues that the members of the WTO have themselves
refused, or been unable, to answer. Although it is sometimes
asked to render decisions on quite technical legal issues, its
decisions often present, and
require, decisions on broad policy
212
importance.
great
of
issues
Within this environment, the deliberate and systematic
approach of the Appellate Body takes on special importance.
Although the Appellate Body wields only interpretive power,213
that power is significant, and is capable of both abuse and of
positive impact.
Should the Appellate Body exercise its
interpretive powers without a sound appreciation for the systemic
implications of its decisions, the Appellate Body would do great
damage.214 On the one hand, if the Appellate Body were to engage
in too much creative lawmaking, it could easily upset the systemic
balance that WTO members have sought to achieve. On the other
hand, if the Appellate Body were to engage in too literal a reading
of the terms of the treaty, without understanding the systemic
needs of the WTO, the Appellate Body could risk destabilizing the
system in a different direction.215 The fact that the Appellate Body
210

Id.

211 Some commentators have become concerned that the Appellate Body has no
"political escape valve." See McRae, supra note 3, at 19.
212 See Steven Chamovitz, JudicialIndependence in the World Trade Organization,
InternationalOrganizationsand InternationalDispute Settlement: Trends and Prospects
231-232 (2002), available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/articles/charnovitzjudicial
.pdf.
213 Id.
214 Some commentators, in fact, are highly critical of the Appellate Body for
usurping issues that are more properly the jurisdiction of the members, either collectively
or individually. See generally John Ragosta, et al., WTO Dispute Settlement: The System
is Flawed and Must be Fixed, 37 INT'L LAW 697 (2003) (suggesting that the Appellate
Body leave more issues to individual or collective members).
215 Given its own balancing act, it is not surprising that the Appellate Body is
subject to criticism for being both too literal and too policy driven. See, e.g., McCrae,
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makes deliberate and thoughtful decisions provides assurances that
it is trying to avoid decisions that could do fundamental violence
to the stability and functioning of the system.
Given the Appellate Body's deliberate approach to decisionmaking, and the systemic implications of its decisions, it is
worthwhile to develop an understanding of which systemic
characteristics are likely to have the greatest leverage on the
Appellate Body. How should we think about the systemic values
that seem to be at stake when the Appellate Body exercises its
interpretive discretion?
Most commentators who have ventured an answer to this
question have taken an institutional view of the role of the
Appellate Body.
Under one institutional perspective, the
Appellate Body is allocating decision-making power among the
various institutional actors that have a stake in the decision. 1 6 For
example, the Appellate Body must allocate decision-making
power among the various countries with interests in the subject
matter, either restraining the power of one or unleashing the power
of another, and must determine how much weight to give to the
decisions made by that country or its administrative organs.2"7 A
decision allowing a member to block imports is, in effect, a
judgment that the country's institutional arrangement is competent
to make the decision on that kind of a question. A decision that
prohibits a country from making a decision effectively allocates
decision-making power elsewhere. And a decision that requires a
member to consult with others before drawing a conclusion
effectively establishes a different institutional arrangement for
making such a choice. Under this vision, the Appellate Body is in
the business of deciding who should determine various matters of
policy.
A variant on this lens, one that also focuses on institutional
supra note 3, at 5 (stating "on the one hand there are those who think that the approach

has led to too rigid adherence to text, ignoring the intent of the negotiators. On the other
hand, there are those who think that the Appellate Body has ignored the text and that its
decisions are based on its own particular view of how trade should be liberalized").
216 See Gregory Shaffer, Power, Nested Governance, and the WTO: A Comparative

Institutional Approach, Mar. 1, 2004 (manuscript on file with the author); Shaffer &
Apea, supra note 15, (analyzing the EC-Preferences case in terms of allocating
institutional power to decide that nature of preference programs).
217 Id.
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competency to make the decision, recognizes that WTO members
can reverse Appellate Body decisions. According to this view,
Appellate Body decisions set up the negotiations among WTO
members.2"8 In a sense, the Appellate Body is deciding which
member should have the burden of going forward in negotiations
to secure a rule that would overturn the Appellate Body's
interpretation. Because negotiations are the only method of
reversing a decision of the Appellate Body, this effectively means
that the Appellate Body is deciding which member or group within
the WTO should have to pay to reverse the decision - that is,
which country (or group of countries) should have to give up
political and economic capital to have the. result changed?
Under this vision, it is not surprising that the Appellate Body
often seems to compromise in its decisions, allowing each side to
claim a measure of victory and to absorb some measure of the cost
of the decision.219
One would expect this method of
compromising in a system where it is clear that the result of the
decision is to require the parties to negotiate over their rights and
obligations, a process that is inherently fraught with compromise.
Moreover, this proclivity to compromise is coupled with the
recognition that the Appellate Body faces constraints that naturally
lead it to be conservative and to minimize the use of its own
power, including the need to promote the acceptability of its
decisions to powerful countries. °
Our approach honors these institutional perspectives, but adds
another dimension. As we demonstrate below, we believe that the
Appellate Body recognizes that the WTO is a system in which
members have unequal bargaining power and where bargaining is
the basis of systemic equilibrium. Within this context, we see the
Appellate Body functioning effectively as a kind of power broker
in a system that would otherwise pit the powerful industrial
countries against the less powerful developing countries. As we
see it, within the confines of its interpretive space, the Appellate
218 See Richard H. Steinberg, Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive,
Constitutional,and PoliticalConstraints, 98 AM. J. INT.' L. 247 (2004). See generally
Carol J. Miller & Jennifer L. Croston, WTO Scrutiny v. Environmental Objectives:
Assessment of the InternationalDolphin ConservationProgramAct, 37 AM. Bus. L.J. 73
(1999) for examples of post-WTO decision negotiations.
219 See Steinberg, supra note 218.
220

See id.; Miller & Croston, supra note 218.
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Body is crafting a jurisprudence of power and participation that
allows it to adjust rights and responsibilities to reflect relative
power, while recognizing the importance of both respecting and
restraining power in the system. Under this view, the Appellate
Body functions as an institutional gyroscope, one that provides
balance in a system that, if unbalanced, could fall apart.
Our perspective is built on the understanding that the WTO
regime must function as a rule-based regime (so that states will be
willing to make commitments), but that binding commitments are
" ' In this system,
made in anticipation of certain future benefits.22
the continued success of the regime requires that gains for all
members continue to outweigh losses, both ex ante (i.e. in advance
of negotiations) and ex post (i.e. after the treaties are
implemented). The reciprocity that is at the heart of the WTO
Because bargaining power is
system requires such balance.
inevitably influenced by economic strength, so too will the balance
of gains and losses from the negotiations also be influenced.
When the ex post world diverges from that expected ex ante world,
the balance of gains and losses is likely to shift over time, and
when it does, the allegiance to the future of the WTO regime also
vacillates, with implications for both compliance with existing
obligations and also the willingness to undertake new obligations.
The role that the Appellate Body can effectively play in this
regime is therefore to decide cases against a background that
appreciates the political dynamics of the WTO, taking into account
not only the legal arguments but also the position of the parties in
terms of their role in the WTO regime. The Appellate Body's
decisions not only distribute decision-making authority, but they
also respond to, and influence, existing distributions of power. 3
We therefore see the role of the Appellate Body to be that of a
power broker-crafting a set of interpretive tools that seek to
temper the power of industrial countries while not eliminating that
221

Gerhart, supra note 1167.

See, e.g., Patrick Low, Trading Free: The GATT and U.S. Trade Policy 29
(1993) (discussing notions of fair trade and reciprocity, why they are sought through
GATT tariff negotiations, and the difficulties the goal of reciprocity presents); The
Future of the WTO, supra note 88, at 17 ("If [least developed countries] do not receive
real benefit from membership there can be little point in their remaining part of the
organization and the moral case for the WTO as a source of good is diminished.")
223 See supra notes 1 and 26 and accompanying text.
222
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power as a force in shaping that international regime. The ECConditional Preferences decision demonstrates this thesis by
showing that the Appellate Body has articulated its interpretive
task to set up a jurisprudence of power and a jurisprudence of
participation.224
A. Jurisprudenceof Power
As we demonstrated above, GSP programs reflect the power
relationship between developed and developing countries in two
ways. First, GSP preferences are a gift, not an obligation, giving
the donor countries the power to withdraw them at any time (a fact
225
that in itself reflects the powerlessness of the poor countries).
Second, donor countries use the GSP preferences as an expression
of their power by making the preferences contingent on conditions
that benefit the donor country, but not the recipient country.226
The Appellate Body has to respond to both expressions of power.
The Appellate Body's jurisprudence is a jurisprudence of
power because the standard that will determine which conditions
are acceptable is the standard that focuses on the well being of the
recipient countries, taking into account their developmental,
financial, and trade needs. 227 This creates a perfect match between
the evaluative standard that will determine which conditions are
permissible and the reasons the developing countries lack power.
The developing countries lack power precisely because they have
such great developmental, financial, and trade needs; addressing
those needs addresses their lack of power. 22' This reading is not a
radical or ultra vires interpretation of the Enabling Clause. Rather
it is compelled by reading the Enabling Clause in the context of
the negotiations that led to its enactment.229
Behind the legal issues is a difficult political issue that requires
the Appellate Body to undertake a tenuous balancing act. Because
the developed countries do not have to give preferences, any
224 European Communities-Conditions for Granting Tariff Preferences to
Developing Countries, Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS246/AB/R (April 7, 2004).
225 See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
226

See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.

227

See supra note 157 and accompanying text.

228

See supra notes 149-154 and accompanying text.

229

See supra notes 58-59.
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attempt to restrict the conditions under which they offer the

preferences could backfire and cause the developed countries to
withdraw the preferences altogether. Moreover, because the GSP
preferences have become a tool of political diplomacy-helping to
shape the national policy of the recipient countries in ways that the
donor country thinks are best-legislators who must approve the
GSP programs are likely to resent any restrictions on their ability
to influence what happens in the poorer countries. Having become
acclimated to the notion of conditional preferences, they are
unlikely to easily give up their ability to influence any policy of
recipient countries that they find objectionable.
Moreover, the goals that donor countries seek to achieve with
the conditions that they put on preferences are, in principle, often
ones that are endorsed by the global community.23 ° Arguably the
EC could seek to justify its special incentive programs, promotion
of labor rights and freedoms, environmental preservation, and the
reduction of illicit drug production and trafficking contribute to
the overall positive development of developing countries. One of
the purposes behind the EC's GSP was to use this particular trade
policy instrument as a means to address issues of sustainable
development and to influence the social, environmental, and
welfare aspects of trade.2 3' A strong political interest therefore
pulls in favor of allowing developed countries to have relative
freedom in what conditions they impose when they give
preferential treatment.
On the other hand, the intent of the Enabling Clause clearly
was to restrict the donor country's use of conditions so that the
preferences would be true gifts.232

Conferring a benefit on

230 Numerous international institutions are working to achieve goals in the area of
environmental labor rights, for example, giving the donor countries support for their
argument that they are seeking no more than these international organizations seek. On
the relationship between the WTO and these other areas of international law, see
Symposium, The Boundaries of the WTO, 96 Am. J. Int'l L. i (2002).
231 Further, in the words of the EC, trade is not an end in itself but a means to an
end. For example, the EU linked trade to environmental standards in order to protect
natural resources. EU-LDC Themes - Social, Environmental & Welfare aspects of Trade
Policy, The EU-LDC Network, at http://62.58.77.238/themes/socialwelfare/socialwelfare
_policy.php (last visited Oct. 29, 2003). The EC also reminded the WTO DSB that its
special incentive arrangements were in line with internationally recognized objectives
aimed at the promotion of sustainable development. Id.
232 See generally Uche Ewelukwa, Special and Differential Treatment in
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developing countries is the essence of the GSP system; to be
effective, the preferences must confer benefits on the recipient
countries and thus serve as a constant reminder of the benefits of
membership in the WTO system that inure even to the powerless.
If the conditions impose costs on the recipient country, they
reduce the benefit of the preferences.233 There must be some
control on the use of preferences or the cost of the conditions
could soon take away any benefit from the preferences.
Given these contradictory tendencies, the difficult role of the
Appellate Body is to find a way to balance the legal requirement
that the preferences be general, non-discriminatory and nonreciprocal, while at the same time recognizing the practical need to
allow the donor countries to place some conditions on the receipt
of the gifts.
B. Jurisprudenceof Participation
The Appellate Body's jurisprudence is also a jurisprudence of
participation, for it emphasizes the right of developing countries the powerless - to participate in shaping the programs that affect
their future. 34
One of the hallmarks of the Appellate Body's developing
jurisprudence is the requirement that a country which proposes to
take action implicating the interest of another member must first
offer the other country basic procedures through which it can
express its interests. 235 While this general requirement mirrors the
many specific instances in which the covered treaties specifically
mandate such procedures, the Appellate Body has frequently
found a basis for inferring a requirement of due process when it is
not otherwise specified in the treaties.23 6 The EC-Conditional
International Trade Law: A concept in search of content, 79 N.D. L. REv. 831 (2003)
(discussing the Enabling Clause and and special treatment for the least developed
countries).
233 See supra section II.B.
234 See generally Jennifer L. Stamberger, The Legality of ConditionalPreferences to
Developing Countries under the GATT Enabling Cause, 4 CHi. J. INT'L L. 607 (2003)
(addressing the possible future of the Enabling Clause as a mechanism for establishing
developing country treatment of such goals as higher labor standards, environmental
protection, and prevention of drug trafficking).
235 Gerhart, supra note 1 at 61-70.
236 Id.
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Preferences case is only one example of a case in which this
occurred; the requirement of some form of process where one
country is making decisions that affect the interest of other
countries has become a part of the unwritten constitution of the
WTO.237
The right to participate is not just an abstraction. Participation
is a source of power. Even those without substantial bargaining
power can benefit if their right to participate is protected. Their
reasoned argument may carry weight; their expressions of their
own capacities, interests, and values may turn out to be persuasive.
Even if their bargaining power is small, it will be greater when it
can be expressed in a forum where others must listen. When the
right to participate includes a number of countries, the bargaining
power of one country can be magnified by being expressed in
conjunction with the bargaining power of another country.
Not only are the procedural rights created by the Appellate
Body a source of power for developing countries, the procedural
requirements also allow the Appellate Body to influence the
balance of power as they make judgments about whether the
procedural requirements have been met in good faith.2 38 Naturally,
the procedural requirements do not themselves predetermine any
particular outcome for the negotiations; the negotiations will still
respond to the underlying power of the parties involved. But the
procedural requirements do allow the Appellate Body to puts its
thumb on the scale of justice to determine whether the correct
procedures have been followed in the correct way.
The
requirement that donor countries make explicit the basis on which
the conditions they impose are thought to enhance the
development, finance, and trade needs of recipient countries
protects against decisions that are in the interest of donor but not
recipient countries.
The associated requirement that donor
countries give potential recipient countries an opportunity to show
that they meet the relevant criteria protects against arbitrary
application of this criteria. The requirement that the list of
beneficiary countries be held open 23 9 allows countries to avoid
unjustifiable exclusion, and the requirement that beneficiary

238

Id.
Howse, Back to Court After Shrimp/Turtle, supra note 12.
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countries be dropped from the list when the special preferences are
no longer warranted2 40 protects against uneven treatment of
similarly situated countries. The Appellate Body controls the
power relationship between strong and weak countries by
controlling the terms under which strong countries make decisions
that affect the weak countries.
VII.Conclusion
The fundamental challenge facing the WTO regime is to
construct a law-based system in the context of negotiations that are
inevitably power-based. The regime must be law-based because
the regime's success depends on inducing members to commit to
change their domestic policy on the condition that other members
will commit to change their policy. Member commitments are
therefore constructed around expectations about the intentions and
fidelity of other members. The mutual commitments at the heart
of the WTO system are strengthened to the extent that
international law can ensure that the expectations they embody
will be fulfilled. When commitments are enforceable, members
are induced to trust the commitments made by others and are
therefore induced to increase their own commitments.
Negotiations of member commitments are inherently powerbased, for the negotiations reflect the existing distribution of
economic and, to some extent, political power.24 ' Admittedly, the
Uruguay Round agreements have made the WTO regime more
"legalized" and the dispute settlement system has not only
enhanced the legal certainty of the commitments made in the
agreements, but (by making treaty interpretation power-neutral)
has enhanced the power of the small countries. Yet even these
strides have not removed economic and political power from the
regime. Negotiations over new treaty commitments, whether to
revise existing disciplines or to create new ones, continue to be
based on economic power. The efforts of the WTO regime to
limit the exercise of unilateral power within the law-based system
have been only partially successful. The WTO regime, for
example, has been unsuccessful at curbing the ability of the
powerful countries to use bilateral and regional agreements to
240

Id.
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break up coalitions of developing countries and to influence
multilateral negotiations. Even the new-found power and resolve
of the developing countries, which is complicating the Doha
Round of negotiations,"' is a reflection of the importance of
power on the system.
Moreover, even though existing obligations are subject to
legalized dispute resolution that is independent of the power of the
members, power continues to pervade the dispute settlement
system as well. Power is inherent when countries make decisions
about whether to challenge the conduct of another state, when they
decide which states to sue, when they determine in pre-dispute
resolution consultations how to achieve a "mutually agreed upon
solution" and when they decide, after the legal process has won its
course, whether to settle the case and how they will exercise their
right to retaliate. Power is also implicated in the efficacy of
retaliation; retaliation as a remedy does not favor the powerless
states. Moreover, the dispute resolution system seems to be
deeply affected by the cost and information requirements of
bringing suit, which also disfavors the poorer states.
Because the WTO system involves lawmaking that reflects the
economic power of the member countries, the poorer developing
countries have long been at a disadvantage in the lawmaking
process. They have not had much to offer to, nor have they been
able to withdraw from, negotiations. As a result, they have had
little opportunity to exert much influence over the course of the
lawmaking. In the absence of some positive reason to participate
in a system in which their participation was, in terms of influence,
at best peripheral, the GATT system threatened to become one of
wealthy countries and to forfeit the promise of becoming a force
for global commerce.
The GSP system was carefully crafted to recognize the
developing country's lack of relative power. As the Appellate
Body astutely recognized, the system was designed to allow donor
countries to give tariff concessions to poor countries without
expecting to get anything in return. Such unilateral, donative
preferences from states with power in the regime to states without
power would address the lack of power of developing countries.
242 Negotiations,implementation and development: the Doha agenda, WTO
at http://www.wto.org./english/tratop-e/dda-e/ddae.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2005).
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These preferences would not only materially benefit the poor
countries; the preferences would also strengthen the GATT/WTO
regime. By giving tangible benefits to those with little power, the
preferences would help ensure the allegiance of the developing
states to the system and would thereby enhance the long-term
stability for the system-a system whose long-run viability
requires that each member have an opportunity to negotiate to
increase its welfare.
The Appellate Body correctly interpreted the Enabling Clause
to embody the fundamental principle that preferences are intended
to be donative, not an exchange, and therefore to benefit the
recipient countries only. Any benefit that the donor countries get
must come from their understanding that their long-term interest is
in the growth of the developing countries and in the breadth and
stability that their allegiance to the WTO regime would instill.243
This principle then guides the interpretation of the Enabling
Clause when the Appellate Body is called on to determine whether
conditions that donors placed on the preferences are for the benefit
of the recipient country (and therefore lawful) or whether they are
for the benefit of the donor country (and therefore impermissible).
The legal standard recognized by the Appellate Body fully
embodies the distributive thrust of the GSP program.
This standard inevitably requires the Appellate Body to make
legal decisions in a political context. The fundamental legal
issue-namely, whether the conditions under which the
preferences are given truly address the development, financial and
trade needs of the recipient country-is difficult enough. As we
pointed out above, development experts have not agreed upon
which policies really help developing countries, and the line
between helpful and hurtful conditions is likely to be narrow.
Although the guidelines that we suggested for making that
determination can help bring clarity to the situation by, for
example, putting an emphasis on conditions that are derived from
development plans drawn up by countries in connection with
international aid agencies, difficult legal judgments are inevitable.
Further complicating the legal judgments are the difficult
underlying political issues. Donor countries will continue to
condition preferences on policies in the developing countries that
243 See supra section II.B.
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are in the donor country's interests. Because those conditions
often reflect strongly held values in the donor country, the donor
country's support for granting the preferences in the first place is
likely to erode, and perhaps erode significantly, if the Appellate
Body restricts too much those conditions. The Appellate Body
thus walks a fine line. If it allows conditions on preferences that
are too burdensome and one-sided, it risks allowing the system to
turn from a donative system into a coercive system, where donor
countries condition the preferences just up to the point where they
become worthless. On the other hand, if it cuts back too severely
on the conditions that are permissible, it runs that risk that donor
countries will increasingly reduce the value of the preferences they
give.
Fortunately, the Appellate Body has the tools to undertake this
difficult legal and political balancing act. 2" By reserving to itself
the ability to determine when the conditions on which preferences
are given relate to the welfare of the developing countries, the
Appellate Body, using its interpretive discretion, can effectively
review conditional preferences to insure that they do not reflect the
economic power of the donor countries. By requiring donor
countries to be explicit and open in their decision-making,245 the
Appellate Body can insure that beneficiary countries have a
genuine chance to benefit from the tariff preferences. At the same
time, the Appellate Body can modulate its interpretations to make
sure that tariff preferences continue to be offered by developed
countries. In short, the Appellate Body is in a position to look out
for the systemic interests of the WTO. This is entirely appropriate
in the institutional context in which the Appellate Body operates.
In retrospect, we can see that the real institutional innovation in
the establishment of the Appellate Body was not just the creation
of an independent judicial branch for the WTO. It was also the
establishment of a quasi-judicial body that, in the process of
interpretation, can understand the divergent interests of the
individual members in a context that takes into account the needs
for the WTO system to be balanced and mutually progressive.
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See supra section VI.
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